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1. Introduction 
The status of the right to collective action and its relationship to the freedom of movement 
established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or the Treaty) has 
for long been an unsettled issue in Union law.1 However, in December 2007 the European 
Court of Justice (the ECJ or the Court) delivered two landmark judgments, Viking2 and 
Laval3, on the conflict between the right to collective action protected by national law on the 
one hand and the economic freedoms of movement guaranteed by the Treaty on the other. At 
stake in Viking was the right of the Finnish seamen’s Union (FSU) to resort to industrial 
action vis-à-vis the right of Viking – a ferry operator incorporated under Finnish law – to 
freely establish itself in another Member State. The aim of the action was to prevent Viking 
from reflagging one of its vessels to Estonia, which would enable Viking to reduce wage 
costs. In support of the action, the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) issued a 
circular communication against so called “flags of convenience”, requesting its members, i.e. 
national seafarer’s unions, not to engage in negotiations with Viking. As a consequence, 
Viking challenged the action taken by the FSU as well as the circular issued by the ITF under 
Article 49 TFEU as contravening the freedom of establishment.     
     In Laval, the conflict arose between the Swedish builder’s union (Byggnads) and Laval, a 
Latvian building company who posted workers to Sweden to work on the renovation of a 
school in Vaxholm. With an aim to avoid wage dumping in the building sector, Byggnads 
sought to extend the relevant sectoral collective agreement to the posted workers and 
negotiate wages for them. Laval, who had already signed a collective agreement with the 
Latvian building sector’s trade union, refused. Byggnads responded by initiating a blockade 
of Laval’s building sites. Laval brought an action in the Swedish courts, claiming that the 
blockade was in breach of Directive 96/71/EC (the Posted Workers Directive) and the 
freedom to provide services protected by Article 56 TFEU. Laval also argued that certain 
aspects of the Swedish law known as Lex Britannia, which reserved the mandatory social 
truce to agreements signed with Swedish trade unions, directly discriminated against foreign 
undertakings. 
     In both cases, the interpretation provided by the ECJ clearly went in favour of the 
employers’ side. The Court thus let social policy objectives stand aside to the economic aim 
                                                 
1 Kruse, A., Fackliga stridsåtgärder och den fria rörligheten i EU, ERT, no. 1, (2008), p. 187. 
2 Case C-438/05 The international Trasport Workers’ Federation & The Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line 
ABP & Oü Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779.  
3 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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of creating an internal market with no barriers to trade. The rulings were groundbreaking on 
several points. For instance, the ECJ not only subjected an alleged fundamental right to the 
Treaty provisions on free movement and made it conditional on the satisfaction of a strict 
proportionality test, but it also applied those provisions to private parties, i.e. trade unions. 
The judgements have caused intense debates among scholars as to their practical and legal 
scope. Consequently, Viking and Laval did not settle the conflict between the right to 
collective action and the freedom of movement once and for all. Rather, the rulings give rise 
to more than a few questions as to the legal scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement 
with regard to collective action, some of them which will be dealt with in this essay.    
1.2 Purpose and research questions 
Viking and Laval induced strong reactions from the European trade union movement, who 
expressed deep concerns that the judgments will lead to social dumping and a race to the 
bottom, as they seemingly reduces the possibility to protect the workforce by way of 
collective action from regulatory competition of Member States with low labour standards. 
However, one issue that is often overlooked is that these cases also entail that the precedents 
of Union law might even penetrate domains which so far for granted has been considered as 
internal matters of each Member State to decide upon. Since the ECJ chose not to exclude 
collective action from the scope of free movement, any such action, not only those aimed at 
battling low-wage competition, is now liable to become subject to the scrutiny of the ECJ. 
Given the Court’s extremely broad interpretation of the cross-border criterion, 4 it seems as if 
few actions will escape the ambit of free movement. If so, this would bring an entirely new 
dimension to national collective bargaining systems, as trade unions always would have to 
calculate with the disruption to inter-state trade that an action might cause and be prepared to 
justify it against public interests of the Union. In effect, trade unions in high-cost states may 
find themselves not simply undercut by lower standards in other countries, but unable even to 
initiate collective action on the ir national territory against domestic companies, as long as 
there is the slightest link to Union law.5  
     The aim of this essay is thus to provide a legal analysis of the scope of the free movement 
of services with regard to collective action, which, as opposed to the actions initiated in Viking 
and Laval, is neither aimed at, nor has the effect of making cross-border service provision 
more difficult than national service provision. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to this as 
                                                 
4 See Chapter 2.1.3 below. 
5 Deakin, S., Regulatory competition in Europe after Laval, Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge Working Paper No. 364, (2008), p. 21. 
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non-discriminatory collective action, even though the concept of discrimination is a complex 
and arguably ambiguous one. To clarify which situations that will fall within the ambit of the 
given definition of non-discriminatory collective action, I will provide for a few examples. 
Imagine an ordinary wage strike against a service providing company with business in more 
than one Member State. Even though that company will be equally prevented from providing 
services in the home state the strike will in fact, so long as it lasts, bar the company from 
providing services in other Member States, thus seemingly constituting a restriction on the 
free movement of services. For instance, if the employee’s of Laval in Latvia would have 
gone into strike, that company would have been hindered to provide services in Latvia as well 
as in Sweden. Or take a strike similar to that in Viking as an example, although with an aim to 
gain improved working hours instead of that to prevent a company from establishing itself in 
another Member State. Such a strike would in practice impede the company from providing 
services in the states covered by the vessel’s route. Or, finally, picture a blockade against a 
subcontractor in a host state on whom a foreign operator providing services in that state is 
dependent. Since that blockade would obstruct the foreign operator’s provision of services, it 
might amount to a restriction on Article 56 TFEU. 
     In order to attain the stated aim I will try to answer the following questions. Which 
criterion is applied to limit the scope of Article 56 TFEU, i.e. to identify a restriction on the 
free movement of services, and how does it relate to non-discriminatory collective action? 
When may Article 56 TFEU be applied horizontally to trade unions? Finally, how is the right 
to collective action to be reconciled with the freedom of movement? 
1.3 Delimitations 
My area of research will be Union law, not labour law. Consequently, I will solely examine 
the right to take collective action in a Union free movement context and not engage in an 
assessment of that right in relation to national labour laws. Furthermore, my main area of 
research will be delimited to the free movement of services. However, I will also study cases 
concerning the other freedoms insofar as they are relevant for interpreting Article 56 TFEU. 
Not least, analogies will be made from the freedom of establishment and the Viking case, as it 
provides for valuable guidance on how to assess collective action in relation to free 
movement. Finally, I will not analyze the application and implications of the Posted Workers 
Directive. The reason is twofold. Firstly, such an analysis would simply make the essay too 
voluminous and, secondly, collective action that brings the directive to the fore will most 
likely not be of a non-discriminatory character within the meaning of this essay and, 
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therefore, such action would for the most part fall outside the aim of this essay. Any further 
delimitation will be announced in connection to the relevant chapter. 
1.4 Method and material  
In order to answer my research questions I will use traditional legal method, i.e. the dogmatic 
one, which has as its main objective to interpret and systemize the legal situation in relation to 
a certain issue or area of law.  Hence, I will engage in a de lege lata analysis of the scope of 
the free movement of services with regard to collective action, using the provisions of the 
Treaty and the jurisprudence of the ECJ as my point of departure. Apart from the case- law of 
the ECJ, I will to some extent examine the opinions of the Advocate Generals (AG). Even 
though the Court is not legally bound by those opinions, they are very influential and often 
shed light on the meaning of obscure judgments.6 Therefore, I find them useful tools for 
understanding and analyzing as well as outlining forthcoming tendencies in the case- law of 
the ECJ. Furthermore, in relation to the question of reconciling fundamental rights and 
freedoms, I will pay attention to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Like the opinions of the AGs, those judgments are not binding upon the Court, but can be 
useful in scrutinizing the reasoning of the ECJ, since the latter normally takes account of the 
precedents of the ECtHR. 7 This means that when the meaning of a ruling of the ECJ that 
involves fundamental rights issues is unclear, there are reasons to believe that it is not 
intended to directly contradict judgements of the ECtHR addressing the same issue. In that 
sense, the latter can provide for some guidance on how to interpret such rulings of the ECJ. 
Finally, in order to penetrate the judgments of the Court and discern different possible 
interpretations, I will study academic literature encompassing textbooks and articles 
addressing the subject matter of this essay. 
     To understand my choice of material and the emphasis I put on the case- law of the ECJ it 
is significant to stress the crucial role that case- law plays as a legal source in Union law. Due 
to the vague and goal-oriented provisions of the Treaty and the lack of travaux préparatoires 
the judgements of the Court, whose interpretative activities sometimes can be described as 
close to that of law-making, has in many areas in practice become the main source of Union 
law.8 Therefore, my main focus will lie in interpreting and analyzing the meaning and 
consequences of those judgments for the subject-matter of this essay. To understand my 
                                                 
6 Craig, P. and de Búrca, G., EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials, (2008), p.70. 
7 Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EU Law, (2006), p. 342 ff. See als o Reich, N., Fundamental Freedoms 
v. Fundamental Rights: Did Viking get it Wrong? ERT, no. 4, (2008), p. 857. 
8 Hettne, J. and Otken Eriksson, I. (Eds.), EU-rättslig metod, (2005), p. 30 and 89 f. 
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analysis one must be familiar with the Court’s method of interpretation, which is generally 
described as teleological. This means that the Court tends to examine the whole context in 
which a particular provision is situated, and gives the interpretation most likely to further 
what the Court considers that provision sought to achieve.9 One must also understand that the 
Court is aware of the political environment in which it acts and that its judgments are 
sometimes influence by relatively non- legal arguments relating to the potential financial or 
social impact of a ruling.10 Hence, my analysis is based on the assumption that the Court takes 
such teleological, contextual and, to some extent, political considerations. Therefore, it will 
encompass a critical review of how such considerations have influenced the rulings under 
scrutiny, notably Viking and Laval, and how they can be expected to influence the outcomes 
in cases of non-discriminatory collective action. I will also make some statements de lege 
ferenda, in the light of such considerations. In these respects, my method can be characterized 
as ‘critically dogmatic’.11  
 
The Treaty was renamed, from the Treaty establishing the European Community (the EC 
Treaty) to its current name, and renumbered due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009. I will consistently use the current name and numbers in relation to all 
cases and other materials. Hence, when quoting a text that refers to an article of the EC Treaty 
I will replace it for the corresponding one of the TFEU.  
1.5 Disposition 
This essay is structured as follows. The second chapter offers a brief overview of the basic 
legal concept of the free movement of services. Although this chapter will not directly address 
my research questions, it is in my view crucial for appreciating the analysis in the subsequent 
chapters. The third chapter deals with the question of how the scope of Article 56 TFEU is 
limited. In other words, it seeks to identify the relevant criteria for determining whether a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services is at hand. Such an examination is necessary in 
order to answer the question whether non-discriminatory collective action may fall within the 
scope of Article 56 TFEU, particularly since the role of the non-discrimination principle is far 
from clear. The fourth chapter examines the application of Article 49 and 56 TFEU to trade 
unions in Viking and Laval. The aim is to determine whether the Court’s reasoning in those 
cases concerning horizontal direct effect can be extended to other types of collective action, in 
                                                 
9 Craig and de Búrca, p. 73 f. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Sandgren, C., Vad är rättsvetenskap? Festskrift till Peter Seipel, (2006) p. 534 f. 
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particular to non-discriminatory ones. The fifth chapter is devoted to the conflict between 
fundamental freedoms and the fundamental right to collective action. I will, in the light of 
preceding case-law, critically analyze how the Court solved that conflict in Viking and Laval 
and try to appraise the general consequences of those judgements for future conflicts between 
those interests. Chapters four and five thus differ from chapter three in that those chapters 
engage in a careful analysis of the Court’s reasoning in Viking and Laval, while chapter three 
is more concerned with the Court’s general jurisprudence on how to identify a restriction on 
the freedom of movement. This is due to the Court’s scarcity of reasoning in respect of this 
question in Viking and Laval; those cases do simply not provide a sufficient basis for outlining 
the limits of Article 56 TFEU. The essay will end with a discussion and overall conclusions in 
chapter six. 
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2. The free movement of services – an overview 
The aim of this chapter is, as the heading suggests, to provide an overview of the Treaty 
provisions on free movement of services and the jurisprudence of the ECJ relating to those 
provisions. Consequently, I will not offer a detailed breakdown of each element of the 
concept of services, but briefly outline the legal background necessary to be acquainted with 
for the understanding of the analysis to follow. 
2.1 The concept of services 
The free movement of services is established in Article 56  and 57 of the Treaty, the former 
provision setting out a general prohibition on restrictions on the freedom to provide services 
and the latter defining the notion of services in the Treaty sense of the term. According to 
Article 56 TFEU, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be 
prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the 
Union other than that of the person for whom the services are intended. Article 57(1) TFEU  
provides that services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty 
where they are normally provided for remuneration, insofar as they are not governed by the 
provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons. It follows from 
these two provisions that the concept of services comprises four elements (1) the exercise of a 
service activity, (2) an inter-state element, (3) remuneration and (4) non-applicability of the 
other freedoms. In the following sections I will explicate these elements in turn. First, 
however, I will clarify the beneficiaries of Article 56, that is, who that article  is aiming to 
protect. 
2.1.1 Who can rely on Article 56 TFEU? 
Since the ECJ delivered the ruling of Van Binsbergen, natural or legal persons can invoke 
Article 56 TFEU directly before the national courts of the Member States, as the provision 
was given direct effect.12 In order to benefit from the Treaty provisions on services, the person 
must have the nationality of a Member State, which applies to natural as well as legal persons. 
The nationality of a legal person is defined in Article 54 TFEU as a company or firm formed 
in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the Union. If a company’s central 
                                                 
12 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsverenigin voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 1299 
para. 27. 
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administration or principal place of business is located outside the EU, the company’s 
activities must have a real and continuous link with the economy of a Member State.13 
     So which natural or legal persons with the nationality of a Member State can turn to the 
national courts in reliance of the Treaty provisions on services? As the wording of Article 56 
and 57 TFEU indicates, providers of services can claim protection under the Treaty rules 
relating to services. Furthermore, the Court has accepted that certain persons may claim rights 
on behalf of the provider.14 Even though not expressly referred to in Article 56 TFEU, also 
recipients of services can rely on that article. This was initially established in Luisi and 
Carbone where the Court found that the freedom to receive services was the necessary 
corollary of the freedom to provide services and, consequently, that the freedom to provide 
services includes the freedom for the recipients to go to another Member State in order to 
receive a service there, without being obstructed by restrictions. Examples of persons that are 
to be regarded as recipients of services are tourists, persons receiving medical treatment and 
persons travelling for the purpose of education or business.15   
2.1.2 The exercise of a service activity 
Apart from the elements enumerated in section 2.1, the Treaty is relatively quiet in regard of 
what kinds of activities that may constitute services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. 
However, a few examples of such services are given in Article 57(2) and 58 TFEU, including 
activities of an industrial and economic character, activities of craftsmen and the professions 
and services within the field of transports.16 These were areas which, at the time of the 
establishment of the Treaty, were considered to be especially important to liberalize. But as 
technology has enhanced the mobility of persons and information an increasing number of 
activities have been exercised across the boarders. This development is reflected in the case-
law of the ECJ, which has expanded the list of services caught by Article 56 significantly. We 
have seen how diverse activities such as tourism,17 medical18 and financial19 activities, the 
transmission of a television signal,20 debt collection work21 and sporting activities22 all 
                                                 
13 General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services, OJ 002 , 15/01/1962, 
English special edition: Series II Volume IX.   
14 See e.g. Case C-60/00 Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279   in which 
the wife of a British national invoked the rights of her husband as a service provider. 
15 Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/82 Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro  [1984] ECR 377 paras 10 and 16. 
16 Transport services are however, by reference in Article 58 TFEU, governed by the provisions relating to 
transports. 
17 Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83 Luisi and Carbone. 
18 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473. 
19 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën  [1995] ECR I-1141.   
20 Case 155/73 Giuseppe Sacchi  [1974] ECR 409. 
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constitute services. Not even the morally questionable character of an activity removes it from 
the scope of the free movement of services, provided that the service is lawful in another 
Member State. Hence, in Grogan23, the Court declared that abortion, which was legal in 
several Member States, was a service within the meaning of the Treaty. Likewise, in 
Schindler, 24 the Court found that lotteries, despite their harmful nature, fell within the scope 
of Article 56 TFEU.  Because of the Court’s broad and inclusive interpretation of the Treaty 
provisions of Services, it seems as if few activities are excluded from their protection. 25  
2.1.3 Inter-state element 
As follows from the wording of Article 56 TFEU, a precondition for its application is a cross-
border or inter-state element, the relevant criterion being that the provider and the recipient 
are established in different Member States. The cross-border element can thus be satisfied in 
three different ways (1) the provider of services travels to another Member State to provide 
services there, (2) the recipient travels to another Member State to receive services there and 
(3) the service itself travels by means of post or telecommunication. 26 The third situation was 
at hand in Alpine Investment, where a company was prohibited by their national authorities 
from cold-calling, i.e. from telephoning individuals in the Netherlands or in other Member 
States to offer them various financial services, without the prior written consent of the 
individuals concerned.27 The Court held that Article 56 TFEU covers services which the 
provider offers by telephone to recipients established in other Member States and provides 
without moving from the Member State in which he is established.28 This case demonstrates 
that the ECJ is focusing increasingly on the mobility and availability of the service in question 
rather than emphasizing the person, i.e. the provider or the recipient who is involved.29 It 
should also be noted that the case concerned a Dutch prohibition which was challenged by a 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede v. Sandker [1996] ECR I-6511. 
22 Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97 Deliége [2000] ECR I-2549. 
23 Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v. Grogan and others [1991] 
ECR I-4685   
24 Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039. 
25 Barnard, C., The substantive law of the EU – The four freedoms, (2007), p. 360. 
26 St Clair Renard, S., Fri förlighet för tjänster – tolkning av artikel 49 EGF, (2007), (herinafter St Clair Renard, 
(2007)) p. 34 f. 
27 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments.  
28 Ibid., paras 20-22. 
29 Craig and de Búrca, p. 817 f. See also case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085. 
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Dutch company. Hence, the case illustrates that Article 56 cannot only be invoked against the 
host state, but also against the home state in which the claimant is established.30 
     The inter-state requirement thus excludes purely internal situations from the scope of the 
Treaty rules on services.31 However, due to the Court’s broad interpretation of the cross-
border criterion there seems to be few other situations that escape the prohibition in Article 56 
TFEU as being purely internal.32  The case just mentioned, Alpine Investments, can serve as 
an example of this. The Court ruled that Article 56 does not require the prior existence of an 
identifiable recipient, but covers services which the provider offers to potential recipients 
established in other Member States.33 This finding, that a potential cross-border element is 
sufficient for Article 56 to come into play, has been confirmed in later judgements e.g. in 
Gourmet.34 A conclusion which can be drawn from these cases is that, as long as the business 
plan, the structure of the service provider and the nature of the services indicates that there is 
an intention and a material possibility to provide cross-border services, the situation will not 
be considered as purely internal.35 
     Although the Court made a broad interpretation of the inter-state criterion in Alpine 
Investments, the perhaps most remarkable case in this regard is the Carpenter judgement.36 
The case concerned a Filipino woman who was to be expelled from the UK for having failed 
to comply with the domestic immigration requirements. Thus, no link to Union law seemed to 
exist. The Court, however, focused on the fact that Mr Carpenter, who ran a business selling 
advertising space in medical and scientific journals, was a service provider within the 
meaning of Article 56 TFEU, since many advertisers, i.e. potential service recipients, were 
established in other Member States. The Court concluded that since the deportation of his 
wife would be detrimental to their family life it would also be harmful to the conditions under 
which he exercised the freedom to provide services. Therefore, the deportation of Mrs 
Carpenter was deemed incompatible with Article 56 TFEU. By accepting such a tenuous link 
to Union law the ECJ has arguably, if not abandoned, at least gone a long way towards 
                                                 
30 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, para. 30. See also Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia v. Corpo dei Piloti 
del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783, para. 30 and Case C-381/93 Commission v. France [1994] ECR I-5145, 
para. 14. 
31 However, in certain sectors such as public procurement and concession contracts , where harmonizing 
legislation has been adopted, the legislation is made applicable even to purely internal situations, see Craig & De 
Búrca, p. 818 and Hatzopoulus & Do, The Case Law of the ECJ concerning the Free Provision of Services: 
2000-2005, CMLRev 43: 923-991, (2006), p. 945 f. 
32 Barnard,  p. 357. 
33 Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments, paras 19 and 22. 
34 Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795, para. 35. 
35 Hatzopoulus & Do, p. 943 f. 
36 Case C-60/00 Carpenter.  
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eroding the principle that Union law does not apply to wholly internal situations in the field of 
services.37    
2.1.4 Remuneration 
The requirement of remuneration means that a service has to be of a commercial or economic 
nature to fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU. The essential characteristic of 
remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is 
normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service.38 However, as the 
Court made clear in Bond, remuneration does not need to flow directly from the recipient of 
the service to the provider, so long as the service is to be paid for by some party. 39  
     The requirement of remuneration was introduced to avoid public service tourism, i.e. to 
prevent persons from countries with a low tax rate and poor public services to travel to a 
country with high taxes and take advantage of the ensuing good public services of the latter 
state. Some public services are thus disqualified as services in the Treaty sense of the term.40 
Hence, the Court ruled in Humbel that courses taught under the national educational system of 
Belgium did not constitute services for the purposes of Article 56 TFEU. 41 The Court based 
this finding on the fact that the State was not seeking to engage in gainful activity but was 
fulfilling its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields, 
and that the system was generally funded from the public purse and not by pupils or their 
parents.42 Following the logic of this decision, the ECJ held in Wirth that, although most 
institutions of higher education were financed from public funds, those which were financed 
out of private funds and sought to make a profit, were aiming to offer services for 
remuneration within the meaning of Article 57(1) EC.43 Although not completely abandon, 
the logics from Humbel and Wirth have been restricted significantly by subsequent cases 
concerning access to cross-border health-care. In Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms44 and 
Vanbraekel45 it was settled that medical treatment in a hospital amounts to services. In the 
former case several Member States claimed, in reliance on the Humbel case, that hospital 
services did not constitute an economic activity when provided free of charge under a 
                                                 
37 Barnard, p. 261 and 357 
38 Case 263/86 Beligian State v. Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, para. 17. 
39 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders, para. 16. 
40 Snell, J., Goods and Services in EC Law – A Study of the Relationship Between the Freedoms, (2002), p. 13. 
41 Case 263/86 Humbel, para. 20. 
42 Ibid., para. 18. 
43 Case C-109/92 Stephan Max Wirth v. Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR I-6447, para. 15-17. 
44 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473.  
45 Case C-368/98 Vanbraekel and Others  v. ANMC [2001] ECR I-5363. 
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sickness- insurance scheme.46 The ECJ disagreed and held that the payments made by the 
sickness insurance funds under the contractual arrangements between the funds and the 
hospitals, albeit set at a flat rate, were indeed the consideration for the hospital services and 
unquestionably represented remuneration for the hospital which received them. In addition, 
the Court declared that a medical service provided in one Member State and paid for by the 
patient should not cease to fall within the scope of the freedom to provide services guaranteed 
by the Treaty merely because reimbursement of the costs of the treatment involved is applied 
for under another Member State's sickness insurance legislation. 47 This reasoning was 
confirmed and extended in Müller-Fauré48 and Watts.49 In contrast to the previous cases, 
Watts concerned a tax-funded health-care system instead of an insurance-based one. 
Neverthe less, the Court found that Article 56 TFEU applied to the situation. 50 The conclusion 
to be drawn from these cases is that there is no exception from the prohibition in Article 56 
for state-provided welfare services. Whether the particularly broad interpretation of the 
remuneration condition in the health-care cases will spill over to other state-provided welfare 
services remains, however, to be seen. 
2.1.5 Non-applicability of the other freedoms 
Article 57(1) TFEU defines services negatively as not being covered by the Treaty rules 
concerning free movement of goods, persons and capital. The free movement of services thus 
seems to be residual vis-à-vis the other freedoms. Correspondingly, the Court stressed in 
Gebhard that the Treaty chapters on the free movement of workers, the right of establishment 
and services are mutually exclusive and that the provisions of the chapter on services are 
subordinate to those of the chapter on the right of establishment.51 On the other hand, in 
regard of goods and capital, the Court has held that the purpose of the negative definition of 
services is merely to ensure that no economic activity falls outside the scope of the 
fundamental freedoms and, therefore, does not establish any order of priority between the 
freedom to provide services and the other fundamental freedoms. Instead, where a national 
measure restricts both the free movement of goods/capital and the freedom to provide service, 
the Court will consider whether one freedom prevails over the other. The Court will then in 
                                                 
46 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, paras 48-49. 
47 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, paras 55 and 58. 
48 Case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA [2003] 
ECR I-4509. 
49 Case C-372/04 Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I-4325. 
50 Ibid., para. 90. 
51 Case C-55/94 Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano  [1995] ECR I-4165, 
para. 20. 
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principle examine the measure in dispute in relation to only one of the two freedoms if it 
appears that one of them is entirely secondary in relation to the other and may be considered 
together with it.52 Accordingly, the main principle, at least as regards collisions between 
goods/capital and services, is that only one freedom should be applied and the criterion for 
determining which one is prevalence.53 Examples of how the Court has applied this criterion 
will be provided in sections 2.1.5.3 and 2.1.5.4. 
2.1.5.1 Services – establishments  
The borderline between the free movement of services and the other freedoms can sometimes 
be difficult to draw. The perhaps most tenuous delineation is that between the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of establishment, as the two liberties are closely related. 
Both freedoms concern self-employed persons or companies who pursue economic activities 
in another Member State.54 The distinction is nevertheless important, since a natural or legal 
person regarded as established will be burdened with all the national rules for establishment in 
the host state.55 So how is the borderline between services and establishments to be drawn? 
Article 57(3) TFEU stipulates that, without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating 
to the right of establishment, the person providing a service may temporarily pursue his 
activity in the State where the service is provided. The key distinction is thus that, while 
establishments are stable and continuous, services are pursued on a temporary basis.56  In 
Gebhard the Court held that the temporary nature of the activities in question has to be 
determined in the light, not only of the duration of the provision of the service, but also of its 
regularity, periodicity or continuity. The mere fact that the service provider equips himself 
with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State (including an office, chambers or 
consulting rooms) does not make him established there.57 Correspondingly, the Court stressed 
in Schnitzer that services within the meaning of the Treaty may cover services varying widely 
in nature, including services which are provided over an extended period, even over several 
years.58 However, the freedom to provide services does not reach so far as to activities carried 
                                                 
52 Case C-390/99 Satelite Canal Digital SL v. Adminstración General del Estado, and Distribuidora de 
Televisión Digital SA [2002] ECR I-607, para. 31; Case C-20/ 03 Burmanjer and Others [2005] ECR I-4133, 
paras 33-35 and Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz v. Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstungsaufsicht [2006] ECR I-
9521, paras 30-34. 
53 St Clair Renard, (2007), p. 46. 
54 Hatzopoulus and Do, p. 951 f. 
55 Kaczorowska, A., European Union Law, (2009), p. 657. 
56 Ibid., p. 32. 
57 Case C-55/94 Gebhard , para. 27. 
58 Case C-215/01 Schnitzer [2003] ECR I-14847, para . 30. 
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out on a permanent basis, or at least without a foreseeable limit to its duration. Such activities 
will instead be dealt with under the provisions on the freedom of establishment.59  
2.1.5.2 Services – workers  
Contrary to the relationship between services and establishment, the borderline between 
services and the free movement of workers is relatively clear. Unlike service providers, 
workers do not engage in independent activities, but perform their activities under the 
direction of another person. 60 Still, there are a few cases where there has been some confusion 
on which freedom to apply, namely those regarding posted workers.61 However, the matter 
has been clarified by the ECJ which repeatedly has held that workers employed by a business 
established in one Member State who are temporarily sent to another Member State to provide 
services do not, in any way, seek access to the labour market in that second State if they 
return to their country of origin or residence after completion of their work. Therefore, such 
situations are to be treated under the rules on services and not under those on workers.62 
2.1.5.3 Services – goods  
The freedom to provide services as well as the free movement of goods deals with products 
which can be subject to inter-state trade. However, there is a crucial difference in that services 
are non-material results of human performances, while goods are material objects.63 This 
distinction might seem clear. Nevertheless, the border between the two freedoms has not 
always been easy to draw, since services are often part of the goods production and vice 
versa. In such cases, as mentioned above, the ECJ endeavours to apply only the prevailing one 
of the two freedoms. Thus, in Schaijk, the Court only examined the contested measure, by 
which test certificates for vehicles were reserved to domestic garages, under Article 56 TFEU, 
despite the fact that servicing of vehicles involved supply of goods such as spare parts and 
oil.64 The Court declared in this respect that such a supply is not an end in itself, but is 
                                                 
59 Case C-456/02 Trojani v. Centre public d'aide sociale de Bruxelles [2004] ECR I-7573, para. 28. 
60 Hatzopoulus and Do, p. 951 f. 
61 A posted worker is defined in ‘Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services,’ Article 2(1), 
as a worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other than the State 
in which he normally works. 
62 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa  [1990] ECR I-1417, para. 15; C-43/93 Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations 
Internationales [1994] ECR I-3803, para. 21 and Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52-54/98 and C-68-71/98 
Finalarte Sociedade Construcao Civil v. Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft  [2001] ECR I-
7832, paras 22-23.  
63 St Clair Renard, (2007), p. 46 f. 
64 Case C-55/93 Criminal Proceedings Against J G C van Schaijk [1994] ECR I-4837. 
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incidental to the provision of services and was, consequently, to be treated under those.65  
Likewise, in Schindler, the importation and distribution of letters, promotional leaflets and 
lottery tickets was not considered as ends in themselves in relation to lottery activities, but 
simply as specific steps in the organization or operation of those activities.66 Therefore, the 
contested measure was only examined in relation to the Treaty provisions on services. The 
same logics were applied in Karner where a company, engaged in the sale of industrial goods 
and the purchase of the stock of insolvent companies, was prohibited from referring to the fact 
that the goods originated from an insolvent estate in their advertising. 67 Since the 
dissemination of advertising was not an end in itself, but a secondary element in relation to 
the sale of the goods in question, the restriction was solely considered in the light of Article 
34 TFEU.68 It follows that the Court generally determines the prevalence criterion by 
reference to the main end of the concerned company’s business activities. 
     In spite of the main principle stipulating that a measure should only be dealt with under 
one freedom, there are cases were both freedoms will apply. When studying the case- law of 
the ECJ one can outline two such situations. Firstly, where the economic activity involved is 
such that it is impossible to establish a hierarchy between goods and services and, secondly, 
where the contested measure is such as to simultaneously restrict both the free movement of 
goods and services.69 Cases in the field of telecommunications provide examples of the first 
situation. While the transmission of television signals as well as installation of 
telecommunication equipment falls within the Treaty rules relating to services, the supply of 
material such as films and other products is covered by the provisions on goods.70 The second 
situation is illustrated by the Gourmet case, which concerned a total ban on the advertisement 
of alcoholic beverages.71 The Court found that, in so far as the prohibition hindered producers 
and importers from marketing and selling their products, it was to be treated under the rules 
on goods, while, inasmuch as it hindered press undertakings to offer advertising space in their 
publications it fell within the Treaty provisions on services.72  
                                                 
65 Ibid., para 14. 
66 Case C-275/92 Schindler, para. 22. 
67 Case C-71/02 Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v Troostwijk GmbH [2004] ECR I-3025. 
68 Ibid., para. 47. 
69 Hatzopoulus and Do, p. 950. 
70 Case 155/73 Sacchi, paras 6-7 and Case C-390/99 Satelite Canal Digital , paras 32-33. 
71 C-405/98 Gourmet. 
72 Ibid., paras 19-20 and 38-39. 
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2.1.5.4 Services – capital  
As to the relationship between services and capital, the distinguishing feature is whether the 
activity involved constitutes a capital movement or a service activity. There is no definition in 
the Treaty of the notion of capital movements. It is, however, settled case- law that the 
nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361 has an indicative value, for the purposes of 
defining the notion of capital movements within the Treaty sense of the term.73 The 
nomenclature lists inter alia direct investments, operations in securities, financial loans and 
credits and transfers in performance of insurance contracts. Consequently, the directive 
contains a number of activities which could also be regarded as services within the meaning 
of Article 56 TFEU. So which rules apply? This question was referred to the Court in Fidium 
Finanz, which concerned requirements of prior authorization for the granting of credit on a 
commercial basis.74 The Court held that such activities concern, in principle, both the freedom 
to provide services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU and the free movement of capital 
within the meaning of Article 63 TFEU. That said, the Court concluded that the impediment 
on the capital movements was merely an unavoidable consequence of the restriction on the 
freedom to provide services and, thus, that it was not necessary to consider whether the rules 
were compatible with Article 63 TFEU.75 The ECJ thus applied the main principle and dealt 
with the contested measure under only one freedom, i.e. the prevailing one. However, the 
ruling does not reveal which factors that was determinative for the choice to apply the Treaty 
provisions on services instead of those relating to capital. Consequently, the need for 
clarification remains.  
2.2 Restrictions on the free movement of services 
While the previous sections have clarified which persons and activities that enjoy protection 
under the Treaty provisions relating to services, the following sections will shed light on the 
types of measures that may constitute restrictions on the freedom to provide services.  
     An absolute prerequisite for the realization of the common market is that no EU citizen is 
discriminated on the ground of nationality. This general principle of non-discrimination is 
established in Article 18 TFEU, which provides that any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited. The consequence of this approach is that a person in a situation 
                                                 
73 Case C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer [1999] ECR I-1661, para. 21; Joined Cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to C-
524/99 and C-526/99 to C 540/99 Reisch and Others [2002] ECR I-2157, para . 30 and Case C-513/03 Van 
Hilten-van der Heijden v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst [2006] ECR I-1957, para. 39. 
74 Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz.  
75 Ibid., paras 43 and 48-49. 
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governed by Union law will enjoy so called national treatment, or, in other words, will be 
placed on a completely equal footing with nationals of the host Member State.76 The principle 
is central to the free movement provisions, since they constitute specific applications of the 
general prohibition of discrimination, which, with regard to services, is evident from Article 
57(2). For long, the principle has been determinative as to which measures that should be 
considered as restrictions within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU. Thus, the ECJ has 
confirmed that the Treaty provisions on services entail the abolition of all discrimination, 
whether direct or indirect, on the ground of nationality.77 However, in more recent years, the 
Court has gone beyond the non-discrimination approach and applied Article 56 TFEU even to 
measures that are neither directly, nor indirectly discriminatory, but which nevertheless are 
considered to impede the free movement of services.78  
     Before looking any deeper into these different fo rms of restrictions, a reservation must be 
made with regard to the classification of the different forms of restrictions used below. That 
classification is by no means self-evident and the line of demarcation between those forms is 
in practice far from being entirely clear.  The judgements of the ECJ are often ambiguous on 
this point and its terminology is not consistent. Therefore, that classification can be disputed, 
but I have chosen the one which seems to be most commonly used in doctrine and which in 
my view is most adequate for analysing the case- law of the ECJ.79 It should also be noted that 
the ECJ frequently uses a generic term for indirectly and non-discriminatory restrictions, 
namely indistinctly applicable measures.80 Consequently, this classification is far from always 
upheld by the Court. 
2.2.1 Direct discrimination  
Direct discrimination means that nationality is the clear and overt distinguishing factor, that 
is, that national rules or administrative measures explicitly treat persons of other nationalities 
differently. 81  Therefore, direct discrimination is sometimes also referred to as distinctly 
applicable measures.82 Such measures may take various forms, from the prohibiting of 
foreign service providers to pursue certain activities to the setting up of less favourable 
                                                 
76 Case 186/87 Cowan v. Trésor public [1989] ECR 195, para. 10. 
77 See e.g. Joined Cases 62 & 63/81 Seco v. EVI [1982] ECR 223, para. 8 and Case C-224/97 Ciola v. Land 
Vorarlberg  [1999] ECR I-2517, para. 13. 
78 Barnard, p. 254 f. 
79 See e.g. Craig and de Búrca, p. 831; St Clair Renard, (2007) p. 84 ff and Barnard, p. 254 ff. 
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81 St Clair Renard, (2007) p. 93. 
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conditions for foreign services. Naturally, the cases where such restrictions are involved are 
relatively few and the main question in those cases has rather been whether the service at 
issue falls within the scope of Article 56 TFEU, than whether the measure is discriminatory. 83 
One such case is the Cowan ruling, where French law made the grant of criminal 
compensation to foreigners subject to the condition that they resided on French territory - a 
condition which was not imposed on the State’s own nationals.84 Given the apparently 
discriminatory character of the rule at issue, the main focus was instead on the question 
whether Mr Cowan could be regarded as a service recipient.  Other examples of direct 
discrimination from case- law is the Italian refusal to allow foreigners to purchase or lease 
housing built or renovated with the aid of public funds or to obtain reduced-rate mortgage 
loans,85 or the Spanish system whereby solely Spanish citizens benefited from free admission 
to national museums, while nationals of other Member States more than 21 years of age were 
required to pay an entrance fee.86 
2.2.2 Indirect discrimination  
Indirect discrimination was defined by the ECJ in Seco as all forms of covert discrimination 
which, although based on criteria which appear to be nationality-neutral, in practice lead to 
the same result as direct discrimination. 87 It follows that, while direct discrimination imposes 
different burden in law, indirect discrimination entails different burden in fact.88 This is the 
result when similar situations are treated differently or when different situations are treated 
similarly.89 The most obvious form of indirect discrimination is when national rules impose 
requirements associated with that of nationality, such as requirements concerning residence90 
and language.91 As regards the former requirement, the Court has held that it has the result of 
depriving Article 56 TFEU of all useful effect, in view of the fact that the precise object of 
that article is to abolish restrictions imposed on persons who are not established or habitually 
residing in the state where the service is to be provided.92 However, there are other more 
subtle forms of indirect discrimination, e.g. requirements as to holding particular licenses93 or 
                                                 
83 St Clair Renard, (2007), p. 94. 
84 Case 186/87 Cowan. 
85 Case 63/86 Commission v. Italy [1988] ECR 29. 
86 Case C-45/93 Commission v. Spain [1994] ECR I-911. 
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88 Barnard, p.256. 
89 Snell, p. 27. 
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92 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen, para. 11. 
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to pay certain fees.94 These rules give rise to discrimination because the requirements create a 
double burden on migrants who have to satisfy two sets of rules, both those of the host and 
the home Member State.95 Consequently, the problem does not lie with the rule itself but with 
the application of the rule to a service coming from another Member State which has a 
different rule.96 One example of this is found in Vander Elst where the employment of 
nationals of non-member states was subject to the payment of a fee to an immigration 
authority. The Court held that, since undertakings established in another Member State was 
already liable for the same periods of employment to pay similar fees in the State in which 
they are established, the fee at issue proved financially to be more onerous for those 
employers, who in fact had to bear a heavier burden than those established within the national 
territory. 97 Although in this case the double burden was evident, there are cases where the 
double burden is more difficult to spot. One such case is De Agostini which concerned a 
Swedish prohibition on advertising designed to attract the attention of children less than 12 
years of age. It might seem as if a prohibition, which applied to undertakings established 
within as well as outside the Member State, would be considered as equally burdensome. 98  
However, the Court found that the prohibition constituted a restriction on Article 56 TFEU 
insofar as the foreign service providers already had to satisfy advertising requirements of their 
home State’s legislation. 99 In this case, the double burden approach seems rather contrived 
and, arguably, the Court could instead have treated the measure as a genuinely non-
discriminatory one, as it did the advertising prohibition in Gourmet.100 
2.2.3 Non-discriminatory measures  
Following the trend in the field of free movement of goods,101 the ECJ brought, in the 1990s, 
genuinely non-discriminatory measures within the scope of the Treaty provisions on services. 
The starting point was the Säger judgment, which concerned German legislation reserving 
activities related to the maintenance of industrial property rights to patent agents.102 The Court 
declared that Article 56 TFEU requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a 
person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any 
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97 Case C-43/93 Vander Elst, para. 15. 
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restriction, even if it applies without distinction to national providers of services and to those 
of other Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a 
provider of services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar 
services.103 This mantra has been repeated by the ECJ in numerous cases, although with slight 
changes or amendments in the terms of expression. Thus, in Arblade104 and Mazzoleni,105 the 
Court added the rendering of the provision of cross-border services less advantageous or less 
attractive to the list.106 In Alpine Investments, the ECJ held that the Dutch prohibition on cold-
calling directly affected access to the market  in services in the other Member States and was 
therefore capable of hindering intra-Union trade in services.107 In Gourmet, the Court stressed 
that the Swedish advertising ban on alcoholic beverages, even if not discriminatory, had a 
particular effect on the cross-border supply of advertising services.108 Despite the difference 
in the terms of expression, a common conclusion can be drawn from these cases, namely that 
a regulation will not fall outside the scope of Article 56 TFEU simply because it is genuinely 
non-discriminatory in law and in fact, unless it also does not in any way affect the access to 
the Market of another Member State.109 
2.3 Justifying restrictions on the free movement of Services 
The fact that a national measure has been found to constitute a prima facie restriction on the 
free movement of service does not necessarily mean that it is incompatible with that freedom. 
The interests of free movement cannot automatically override the interest protected by the 
national measure, since that measure may be aimed to shield interests which, as well as free 
trade, are public interest goals of the Union and thus protected by the Treaty. 110 The Member 
State may therefore try to justify the measure either under the Treaty exceptions or under a 
broader category of exceptions developed by the ECJ, usually referred to as imperative 
requirements in the public interest.111 It should be noted, however, that a measure cannot be 
justified when there is harmonising EC legislation, already satisfying the alleged goals in the 
area concerned.112  
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2.3.1 Treaty exceptions 
The Treaty exceptions to the free movement of services are found in Article 51 and 52 in the 
chapter relating to establishments, but are, by reference from Article 62, extended to cover the 
field of services. These express derogations may be relied upon in order to justify distinctly as 
well as indistinctly applicable measures. In other words, they even cover situations of direct 
discrimination. 113 
     Article 51 TFEU provides for the so called official authority exception, which excludes 
activities connected with the use of official power from the Treaty provisions on services.  
The Court has interpreted the exception narrowly and rejected activities such as those of an 
avocat, even when involving compulsory co-operation with the courts,114 the post of 
commissioner of insurance companies115 and private security activities116 from its scope of 
application.  
     Article 52 TFEU enumerates public policy, public security and public health as grounds 
for justifying restrictions on the free movement of services. Like the official authority 
exception, these grounds have also been interpreted restrictively by the Court, particularly that 
on public policy. The Court has held in this regard that the recourse by a national authority to 
the concept of public policy presupposes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the 
requirements of public policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. 117  
2.3.2 Judicially created exceptions 
In addition to the express derogations in the Treaty, the ECJ has in its case- law developed a 
justificatory test similar to the Cassis de Dijon118 ‘rule of reason’ in the free movement of 
goods context. While in the area of goods the test is usually referred to as mandatory 
requirements, the terms imperative requirements or objective justification is generally used in 
the field of services.119 The origins of this approach in the service context are found in Van 
Binsbergen120and were further developed in Säger121. In the latter case the court confirmed 
that the freedom to provide services may be limited by rules which are justified by imperative 
reasons relating to the public interest and which apply to all persons or undertakings pursuing 
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an activity in the State of destination, in so far as that interest is not protected by the rules to 
which the person providing the services is subject in the Member State in which he is 
established. In particular, those requirements must be objectively necessary in order to ensure 
compliance with professional rules and to guarantee the protection of the recipient of services 
and they must not exceed what is necessary to attain those objectives.122 It follows from this 
statement that a number of conditions have to be satisfied if a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services is to be compatible with Article 56 TFEU. First, the restriction must be 
adopted in the pursuit of a legitimate public interest. The list of interests accepted by the ECJ 
as legitimate is long and includes various grounds such as cohesion of the tax system, 123 
prevention of unfair competition, 124 consumer protection, 125 preservation of the financial 
balance of the social security system, 126 prevention of fraud,127 preservation of national 
historical and artistic heritage,128 protection of creditors,129 and, more importantly for the 
purposes of this essay, protection of workers,130 and fundamental rights.131 It is for the 
national courts to objectively settle whether the rules in question promote a legitimate aim, 
although the ECJ retains the ultimate role of determining the legitimacy of the aim.132  
     Secondly, the restriction must be indistinctly applicable. This means that, contrary to the 
derogations expressly mentioned in the Treaty, the imperative requirements may only be 
relied upon in order to justify measures which are either indirectly or non-discriminatory. 133 
     Thirdly, the restriction must be proportionate to the need to observe the legitimate interest. 
The proportionality test involves two or sometimes three steps. In the first step it is examined 
whether the rule in question is suitable or appropriate in achieving its objectives. This is a 
matter of causality, meaning, that the measure must actually be capable of attaining its 
purported objectives. The purpose of the suitability requirement is to prevent Member States 
from adopting rules that allegedly aim to protect a general interest but in reality have a 
                                                 
122 Ibid., para. 15. 
123 Case C-204/90 Bachmann v. Belgian State [1992] ECR I-249. 
124 Joined Cases C-34 to 36/95 De Agostini. 
125 Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany [1986] ECR 3755. 
126 Case C-157/96 Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-1931.     
127 Case C-275/92 Schindler. 
128 Case C-180/89 Commission v. Italy [1991] ECR I-709. 
129 Case C-3/95 Reisebüro Broede.  
130 Joined Cases C 369/96 and C 376/96 Arblade and Others, para. 36; Case C 165/98 Mazzoleni, para. 27; 
Joined Cases C 49/98, C 50/98, C 52/98 to C 54/98 and C 68/98 to C 71/98 Finalarte, para. 33; Case C 438/05 
Viking, para. 77 and Case C-341/05 Laval, para. 103. 
131 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bendesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609, para. 35. 
132 Craig & de Búrca, p. 828. 
133 Barnard, p. 378. 
 26 
protectionist purpose.134 In the second step, it is determined whether or not the rule exceeds 
what is necessary to attain those objectives, or in other words, whether the aim could be 
satisfied by other, less restrictive means. This is the step which Member States most often fail 
to fulfil. One example is found in the so called German insurance case, were the requirement 
that insurers had to be established in Germany was not considered as necessary in order to 
protect the policy holders.135 Another important aspect of the necessity test, emanating from 
the principle of mutual recognition, is that the requirements of another Member State may not 
be duplicated. It follows that if the provider is subject to safeguarding conditions in the home 
State, the host State cannot justify the imposition of similar conditions.136 The third step is the 
test of proportionality strictu sensu, which entails the balancing of the national rule against the 
Union interest in free trade. Under this test national rules pursuing a legitimate aim can be 
found to infringe the free movement of services if their effect on trade is deemed excessive.137 
The clearest example of the proportionality strictu sensu approach was provided by Advocate 
General Van Gerven in his Opinion in Grogan. Van Gerven held that even if the national rule 
is useful and indispensable in order to achieve the aim sought, the Member State must 
nevertheless drop the rule, or replace it by a less onerous one, if the restrictions caused to 
intra-Union trade are disproportionate, that is to say if the restrictions caused are out of 
proportion to the aim sought by or the result brought about by the national rules.138 However, 
in more recent case- law, the Court has been reluctant to engage in proportionality reviews 
strictu sensu, arguably because of the controversial nature of the test, which empowers the 
Union vis-à-vis Member States and has a centralising character.139  
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3. Limiting the Scope of Article 56 TFEU – which criterion 
applies? 
To return to one of the introducing examples – an ordinary wage strike against a service 
providing company with business in other Member states – it might at first sight appear as if 
the question whether such an action may prima facie falls within the scope of Article 56 
TFEU is already settled. As follows from the review in Chapter two, the inter-state criterion is 
remarkably broad and does not require the prior existence of an identifiable recipient. 
Consequently, it seems sufficient that the service provider generally pursues business in other 
Member States for that criterion to be satisfied. Furthermore, a provider can rely on Article 56 
TFEU against the host state as well as the home state, and, last but not least, no discrimination 
is required. However, the question is not quite that simple. If Article 56 TFEU is thought to 
apply to all national regulations restricting the volume of trade, almost any national measure 
can be caught by it, since nearly all rules are capable of having an adverse effect on the supply 
and demand of services.140 Consequently, in order to avoid such an inflated interpretation of 
Article 56 TFEU, there must be some criteria for limiting the scope of application. Different 
models have been suggested by scholars. First, it has been argued that the non-discrimination 
principle still has a say in the matter.141 Second, comparisons have been made to goods and 
the keck doctrine where the effect on market access is determinative.142 It follows, that in 
order to answer the question whether non-discriminatory collective actions may be caught by 
the prohibition in Article 56 TFEU, it has to be determined which one, if any, of these models 
that applies. Although there are other suggestions on how to limit the scope of application, I 
will in this chapter confine myself to examine two models, simply the ones which in my view 
have the strongest support in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. As to my selection of cases, I have 
chosen to present those which by some means can be held either to falsify or verify the 
examined models. 
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3.1 Discrimination and a differentiated interpretation of Article 56 TFEU 
It is today beyond questioning that Article 56 TFEU does not solely constitute a prohibition 
on discrimination, as this fact was definitely established in Säger and has been confirmed on 
numerous occasions since.143 However, it has been argued that Article 56 TFEU is to be 
interpreted differentially and in some situations be confined to a prohibition on discrimination 
and in others entail the abolition of all restrictions. The differentiated interpretation model is 
based on a partition of the scope of application of Article 56 TFEU into three categories: The 
service activity, service associated legal areas and rights of providers and recipients.144 The 
actual service activity constitutes the core scope of application of the Treaty provisions on 
services and is simply an activity as defined in Article 56 and 57 TFEU, namely an economic 
cross-border activity, with temporary or no physical residence in the host state. Restrictions 
relating to the service activity are measures which directly regulate the conditions under 
which the service may be provided, e.g. authorization requirements, specific demands on 
organizational structure and regulations connected to product quality and professional 
qualifications. It is mainly in this field that the Court’s dynamic and extending interpretation 
of Article 56 TFEU has taken place.145 Hence, the model suggests that, in regard of measures 
relating to the actual service activity, Article 56 TFEU is to be interpreted as a prohibition of 
all restrictions, discriminatory as well as non-discriminatory. 146 Service associated legal areas 
are parts of the law which does not directly regulate the provision of services, but which 
nevertheless affect it. Examples of such areas are tax law, environmental law, laws in the field 
of advertising, social security law, procedural law and labour law. 147 It is thus to this field that 
collective action is to be attributed. Finally, rights for providers and recipients are the rights 
of the persons involved to enter, reside in and exit the territory of another Member State.148 
As for the two latter categories, the model claims that the Court has kept within the 
framework of the prohibition on discrimination. Hence, in respect of service associated legal 
areas and rights for providers and recipients, Article 56 TFEU is to be regarded as an 
expression of the non-discrimination principle and, accordingly, only encompass 
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discriminatory measures.149 An exception is however made for the field of advertising where 
all restrictions are, due to the significance of advertising for cross-border trade, be 
prohibited.150 It follows that, should the Court embrace this model, non-discriminatory 
collective action would fall outside the scope of Article 56 TFEU.  
     In the following sections I will first analyse the case- law of the ECJ in the field of service 
associated legal areas and, second, present some arguments in favour of and against the 
differentiated interpretation model, in order to anticipate the likely outcome should the 
question be referred to the Court.  
3.1.1 Legal analysis 
In order to determine the support of the differentiated interpretation model in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence, I will in the following section analyse the case- law in the field of service 
associated legal areas. For obvious reasons, I will focus on the case- law relating to labour law 
and more briefly examine the other service associated legal areas. 
3.1.1.1 Case-law in the field of labour law 
Before analysing the case law relating to this area, a few remarks should be made on the 
Posted Workers Directive. The directive was introduced, as a result of several Member State’s 
concern about the ECJ’s increasing keenness to apply Article 56 TFEU in the field of labour 
law, in order to limit the application as regards posted workers.151 The directive seeks, by 
means of Article 3 thereof, to lay down mandatory minimum protection rules for workers 
which must be respected by foreign service providers that post workers to the host Member 
State and which, therefore, will not be considered as restricting the freedom to provide cross-
border services. However, by virtue of its minimalist character, the directive does not exhaust 
the application of Article 56 TFEU. A measure that is incompatible with the posted workers 
directive will, a fortiori, be contrary to Article 56 TFEU, because that directive is intended, 
within its specific scope, to implement the terms of that article. On the other hand, to hold that 
a measure conforms with the directive does not necessarily mean that it meets the 
requirements of Article 56 TFEU.152 It follows that, although some of the cases referred to 
below partly concern the application and interpretation of the posted workers directive, they 
are still relevant for the purposes of interpreting Article 56. 
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The first case in the field of labour law that calls for attention is Rush Portugesa. 153 In this 
case, an undertaking established in Portugal brought its Portuguese employees from Portugal 
to France for the carrying out of construction works in the latter State, in contravention of the 
French Labour Code. The ECJ was called upon to give a preliminary ruling on the Labour 
Code’s compatibility with Article 56 TFEU, which made the movement of staff subject to a 
condition as to engagement in situ or an obligation to obtain a work permit. The Court held 
that Article 56  and 57 TFEU precludes a Member State from imposing such conditions, since 
it discriminates against a person providing services established in another Member State in 
relation to his competitors established in the host country who are able to use their own staff 
without restrictions, and moreover affects his ability to provide the service.154 In addition, the 
Court stated that, since the concept of the provision of services as defined by Article 57 of the 
Treaty covers very different activities, the same conclusions are not necessarily appropriate 
in all cases.155 In view of the fact that the measures was found to constitute restrictions on the 
Treaty provision on services because of their discriminatory nature, this ruling fits well with 
the thesis that measures relating to service associated legal areas must be discriminatory in 
order to be caught by Article 56 TFEU.156 Furthermore, it even seems as if the judgement 
confirms the possibility and need for a differentiated interpretation. However, two remarks 
should be made. First, this judgement was delivered prior to the Court’s explicit inclusion of 
non-discriminatory measures within the scope of Article 56 in the Säger case. Hence, the 
Court’s application of the discrimination test was arguably not attributable to the fact that the 
measure related to a service associated legal area, but was simply an expression of the state of 
Union law at that time. Secondly, the statement that the broad concept of services motivates 
different conclusions in different cases was not made in the context of defining the scope of 
Article 56, but referred to the assessment of a derogation laid down in the Act of Accession of 
the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic. Consequently, too far-reaching 
conclusions should in my opinion not be deducted from this case.  
 
In a number of other cases in the field of labour law, the reasoning of the ECJ is rather 
ambiguous. The Court starts in these cases by reaffirming the finding in Säger that the Treaty 
requires not only the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of nationality, but also the 
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abolit ion of any restriction , which is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the 
activities of a provider of services established in another Member State. However, it then 
continues by stating that the application of the host Member State's domestic legislation to 
service providers is liable to prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of services 
to the extent that it involves expenses and additional administrative and economic burdens.157  
Hence, while the Court by its first announcement declares that no discrimination is necessary, 
it seems as if it, by its following statement, requires a dual burden, that is, indirect 
discrimination. So how are these two contradictory statements to be interpreted? On the one 
hand one could argue that the Court indicates that a measure relating to service associated 
legal areas is only capable of rendering the freedom to provide services less attractive in so far 
as it indirectly discriminates against foreign providers. Consequently, this would amount to a 
reading in line with the differentiated interpretation. On the other hand it can be held that the 
application of a national legislation must involve administrative and economic burdens, 
regardless of whether they affect providers within and outside the Member State equally, in 
order for it to constitute a restriction. Without such restrictive elements, the regulation would 
simply not affect the attractiveness of providing services and thus not constitute an obstacle to 
the free movement of services. This would thus be a reading in contradiction to the 
differential application. In any event, theses cases can, when read in the light of the particular 
circumstances, be considered as supporting the thesis of a differentiated interpretation, since 
all the measures at issue can be held to impose double burdens on foreign service providers, 
which already must comply with the labour laws and collective agreements of the home 
state.158 However, in many of these cases the double burden reasoning is, in my view, rather 
contrived. That is particularly so as regards the cases which concern minimum wages. If the 
employer applies the higher minimum wages of the host state, he automatically fulfils the 
minimum wages of the home state. Provided that the related taxes and charges are 
comparable, it is thus inconceivable to talk about an adaptation to two sets of rules which put 
foreign service providers in a less favourable position. On the contrary, they will rather be put 
in an equal position as national service providers. 
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Finally, we have the Laval case in which two questions regarding the right to take collective 
action was referred to the ECJ.159 The first question concerned whether the right of Swedish 
trade unions to resort to collective action against an undertaking established in another 
Member State, in order to force it to enter into negotiations on the rates of pay for posted 
workers and to sign a collective agreement, was compatible with Article 56 TFEU and the 
posted workers directive. Given that certain terms of the collective agreement at issue went 
beyond the minimum protection guaranteed by the posted workers directive, the Court could 
merely conclude that the right to take collective action constituted a restriction, without 
having to address the matter of discrimination. 160 The second question concerned the Swedish 
“Lex Brittania” according to which the prohibition for employers and workers to take 
collective action when bound by a collective agreement was applicable solely to action taken 
by reason of terms and conditions of employment falling directly within the scope of the 
Swedish law on workers. Accordingly, the mandatory social truce was, in practice, reserved to 
agreements signed with Swedish trade unions. The Court held that the freedom to provide 
services implies, in particular, the abolition of any discrimination against a service provider 
on account of its nationality or the fact that it is established in a Member State other than the 
one in which the service is provided. Since the Swedish rules failed to take into account 
collective agreements to which undertakings that posted workers to Sweden were already 
bound in the Member State in which they were established, they were considered to give rise 
to discrimination against such undertakings. Given that they were treated in the same way as 
national undertakings which had not concluded a collective agreement, in effect, different 
situations were treated similarly.161 The case clarifies that the non-discrimination principle is 
not obsolete in the context of the free provision of services. Conversely, it confirms that the 
principle still is the core element of the restriction prohibition in Article 56 TFEU. Thereby, 
the case supports the differentiated interpretation. On the other hand, the Court has signalled 
that Article 56 TFEU first and foremost is a prohibition on discrimination in cases concerning 
the actual service activity as well.162 The fact that it also encompasses other restrictions does 
not absolve the non-discrimination principle of its significance for the realization of the 
common market. Therefore, the support of the differentiated interpretation which the 
reasoning in Laval entails must be considered as fairly weak.  
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3.1.1.2 Case-law in the field of other service associated legal areas 
Another area in which the ECJ frequently has applied Article 56 TFEU is tax law. Like the 
jurisprudence in the field of labour law, the rulings which concern taxes are not entirely 
consistent. In a few cases, the Court has explicitly held that the measure at issue constitutes 
discrimination. 163 By contrast, in other cases, the Court has seemed reluctant to use the term 
discrimination and has merely concluded that there is a restriction. 164 As a consequence, some 
scholars have interpreted the Court’s findings as establishing a prohibition on any restrictions 
in the field of tax law, 165 while others are of the view that this field only requires equal 
treatment, or in other words, just encompasses discriminatory measures.166 However, when 
studying the facts of the cases in which the Court has not explicitly referred to the measure as 
discriminatory, one can conclude that they clearly amount to situations of indirect 
discrimination. Consequently, these cases do not contravene the thesis of a differentiated 
interpretation. 167 Another case in the field of tax law which can be held to support the 
differentiated interpretation model is Mobistar. 168  The ECJ held in this case that measures 
which only create additional costs in respect of the service in question and which affect in the 
same way the provision of services between Member States and that within one Member State 
do not fall within the scope of Article 56  of the Treaty. It then continued to evaluate the tax 
measures at issue in the dispute and found that since foreign operators were not, either in fact 
or in law, more adversely affected by those measures than national operators and since the 
measures did not make cross-border service provision more difficult than national service 
provision, they were not incompatible with the freedom to provide services.169 It seems here 
as if the Court applied a pure non-discrimination approach. If Article 56 TFEU amounts to a 
general prohibition on restrictions, the measure would arguably have fallen within the scope 
of application, since the creation of additional costs must be seen as liable to make the 
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provision of services less attractive. However, it has also been suggested that the ECJ 
combined the discrimination test with a test of market access,170 which also seemed to be how 
the Court applied Article 56 TFEU to the tax measure at issue in Viacom II delivered a few 
months earlier.171 Taking that view, the Case should rather be attributed to the model 
described below in Chapter 3.2. 
 
Another interesting case for the purposes of this analysis is found in the field of procedural 
law.172 The German Code of Civil Procedure only allowed for undertakings to carry out 
judicial debt-collection work for others through the intermediary of a lawyer. Consequently, 
debt-collection undertakings were prohibited from carrying out judicial debt-collection work 
themselves. The Court held that such a prohibition constitutes a restriction on freedom to 
provide services within the meaning of Article 56 of the Treaty, albeit it applies without 
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, since it 
makes it impossible to provide those services in Germany.173 This case directly contravenes 
the differential interpretation theses, since the court applied Article 56 TFEU to a service 
associated legal area even though no discrimination was at hand. In my opinion, it is however 
questionable whether this case should be attributed to the field of service associated legal 
areas. Since the reservation of judicial debt-collection work to lawyers corresponded to a 
prohibition for others to provide such services it directly regulates the provision of services. 
Consequently, it could be regarded as concerning the actual service activity, which entails that 
all restrictions are prohibited.174    
 
Finally, one case in the field of environmental law should be mentioned. The case concerned 
an Italian prohibition for vessels to discharge into the sea substances harmful to the marine 
environment in territorial waters and internal maritime waters. 175 The prohibition was 
applicable regardless of nationality and was challenged by an Italian captain. The Court first 
declared that the prohibition was not discriminatory. However, the Court did not stop there, 
but continued to examine whether the prohibition nevertheless constituted a restriction and 
found that that was not the case. 176 On the one hand it can be argued that if service associated 
legal areas only encompass discriminatory measures, the Court would not have engaged in a 
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general restriction examination. On the other hand it can be alleged that the case can be 
explained by the Court’s inconsistent terminology. When the Court referred to discriminatory 
measures it actually meant directly discriminatory measures and the restriction examination 
was in fact a review of whether the prohibition was indirectly discriminatory. Given that the 
Court motivated its finding by the fact that the prohibition did not afford any particular 
advantage to the domestic Italian market, to Italian transport operations or to Italian produc ts, 
I tend to incline to the latter view. 177 
3.1.1.3 Interim conclusions concerning the differentiated interpretation 
It is difficult to draw a general conclusion from these cases, partly because the ECJ differs in 
its terminology as regards the notion of discrimination and partly because the statements of 
the Court, when read in light of the facts of the cases, are open for interpretation. In most 
cases, however, some form of discrimination has been involved. Still, the Court has repeated 
the Säger formula, thus emphasising that no discrimination is required. One can ask oneself 
why the Court would do so if it intended service associated legal areas to be excluded from 
the application of the Säger doctrine. It is also important to note that the Court itself has never 
made the distinction between measures regulating the actual service activity and measures in 
the field of service associated legal areas. That is merely a construction made in the doctrine. 
Furthermore, I am not convinced that all service associated legal areas should be treated the 
same way. For instance, in the field of taxes and charges, the Court has seemingly kept within 
the framework of a discrimination prohibition. In my opinion this is not surprising, given that 
the imposition of a tax will always render the exercise of the freedom to provide services less 
attractive. Accordingly, if a pure Säger approach was applicable in this field, the obligation to 
pay taxes would automatically constitute a prima facie restriction of the freedom to provide 
services as long as an inter-state element is involved. Obviously, that can not be how Article 
56 TFEU is intended to apply. The same does not necessarily hold true for the other areas. 
Rules in the field of procedural law, for instance, could as well facilitate the provision of 
services rather than obstruct it. In this field there is thus no reason to preclude the application 
of the Säger formula. This also seems to be the view taken by the Court in the above 
mentioned debt-collection case. But how about labour law? The incentives to preclude the 
application of the Säger formula are admittedly not as strong in this area as in the field of 
taxes, since there are labour law which work in favour of the employer. Nevertheless, since all 
rules aimed at protecting workers would most likely decrease the attractiveness of providing 
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services, there are incentives to keep within a pure non-discrimination approach. As follows 
from the analysis above, it is however doubtful whether the jurisprudence of the ECJ supports 
such an interpretation. Furthermore, there are other criteria for limiting the scope of Article 56 
TFEU, as will be shown below. 
3.2 Market access 
Another, and perhaps the most advocated, model for limiting the scope of Article 56 TFEU is 
to use market access as the delimiting criterion. 178 This does not, however, mean that the 
model deems the non-discrimination principle as obsolete. Conversely, discriminatory 
measures are treated as one out of two categories of obstacles to the free provision of services, 
while non-discriminatory measures which affect market access constitute the other.179 This 
model is often held to apply uniformly to the different free movement rules, i.e. not only to 
services but to persons and goods as well. The tendency to include non-discriminatory 
measures within the free movement provisions started in the field of goods and has 
progressively spread to the other freedoms.180 The starting point was the famous Dassonville 
case where the Court held that all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable 
of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Union trade are to be 
considered as restrictions to the free movement of goods.181 This case was followed by the 
equally famous Cassis de Dijon case in which the ECJ introduced the principle of mutual 
recognition, thus signalling its willingness to review all national legislative disparities.182 
However, due to this broad definition of restrictions, almost any national market regulation 
could be caught by Article 34 TFEU even though it was not intended to interfere with free 
movement and the effect on inter-state trade was marginal. This led to an increasing number 
of far- fetched challenges of national regulatory policies, which burdened the resources and 
threatened the legitimacy of the Court. As a consequence of this development, the Court 
delivered its ruling in Keck, which concerned French rules prohibiting resale at a loss, in order 
to limit or clarify the scope of Article 34 TFEU.183  The Court declared that national 
provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as to hinder 
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directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between Member States within the 
meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders 
operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States. The 
rationale behind this finding was that the application of such rules to the sale of products from 
another Member State is not by nature such as to prevent their access to the market or to 
impede access any more than it impedes the access of domestic products. Such rules, i.e. non-
discriminatory measures regulating certain selling arrangements, were therefore considered to 
fall outside the scope of Article 34 of the Treaty. 184 Since the Court delivered this judgement 
it has frequently been suggested that this limitation should, and does, apply to services and 
persons as well, although with less focus on the form of measure (regulating selling 
arrangements) and more focus on the logics behind the ruling, that is, the effect on trade. 
Hence, a refined Keck principle could read “non-discriminatory measures which do not 
impose a hindrance to the access to the market of another Member State will not be caught by 
the Treaty provisions relating to goods, persons and services”.  185 Such a formula could 
however lead to practically the same scenario as the pre-Keck situation, as nearly any national 
regulation could be challenged as affecting market access at least to some extent. It therefore 
follows that this model calls for a way to limit the limitation by some sort of de minimis test. 
186  The most commonly suggested criteria for this purpose is that the effect on market access 
must be direct and/or substantial.187  
3.2.1 Legal analysis 
In the following section I will scrutinize if and how the ECJ has applied the criterion of 
market access and a de minimis test. The analysis will not only be confined to services, but 
encompass case- law in the field of goods and persons as well, since, as mentioned above, this 
model is held to be uniformly applicable.188 
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3.2.1.1 The criterion of market access 
In Leclerc Siplec, a case in the field of goods concerning French rules prohibiting the 
distribution section from advertising on television, Advocate General Jacobs directly 
addressed the question of a refined Keck principle and a de minimis test.189 Whilst 
acknowledging the correctness of the result in Keck, he contested the reasoning for attaining 
that result. First, he questioned the adequacy of making rigid distinctions between different 
categories of rules, and to apply different tests depending on the category to which 
particular rules belong. Second, he disputed the appropriateness of introducing, in relation 
to restrictions on selling arrangements, a test of discrimination. He stressed in that respect 
that if an obstacle to inter-State trade exists, it cannot cease to exist simply because an 
identical obstacle affects domestic trade. Finally, he suggested a single test formulated in 
the light of the purpose of Article 34, namely a de minimis test based on the extent to which 
a measure hinders trade between Member States by restricting market access. He concluded 
that Article 34 should be regarded as applying to all measures which are liable substantially 
to restrict access to the market.190 When applying the test to the advertising prohibition at 
issue in the case he found that the effects of that prohibition did not amount to a substantial 
impact on trade between Member States sufficient to bring Article 34  into play.191 The 
Court, however, repeated its Keck formula and found that the prohibition met the 
requirements of being a non-discriminatory selling arrangement and was thus excluded from 
the scope of application of Article 34 TFEU.192 In my opinion, this does not mean that the 
ECJ rejected the Advocate General’s suggestion. Given that the prohibition did neither 
discriminate, nor substantially affect market access, the two variants of the Keck principle 
led in this case to the same result. Consequently, since the variants were not pitted against 
each other, the Court could avoid taking a stance. The situation would have been different if 
a non-discriminatory selling arrangement actually would have constituted a substantial 
impediment on market access and, therefore, one cannot from this case maintain that the 
Court would have come to the same conclusion in such a case. 
 
Alpine Investments, delivered a few months later, can be held to constitute an example of 
such a situation, that is, when the measure at issue regulates selling arrangements and is 
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non-discriminatory, but nevertheless substantially affects market access.193  In this case, the 
ECJ was explicitly called upon to rule on the application of Keck in the field of services. 
The defendant submitted that the prohibition on cold-calling fell outside the scope of Article 
56 TFEU because it was analogous to the non-discriminatory measures governing selling 
arrangements which, according to the decision in Keck, do not fall within the scope of 
Article 34  of the Treaty. The Court disagreed, noting that the prohibition, which deprived 
the operators concerned of a rapid and direct technique for marketing and for contacting 
potential clients in other Member States, directly affected access to the market in other 
Member States and was therefore capable of hindering intra-Union trade.194 Does this mean 
that the Keck doctrine does not apply to free movement of services? In my opinion the 
answer is negative. On the contrary, by focusing on the rationale behind Keck, i.e. the effect 
on inter-state trade, the Court rather confirmed the applicability of a refined Keck-principle. 
The reason why the Court did not apply the Keck derogation in this particular case was 
simply that the facts of the two cases were not comparable. Unlike the prohibition on resale 
at a loss in Keck, the prohibition on cold-calling in Alpine Investments did affect market 
access and the Keck derogation was therefore not applicable.  
     A similar result was subsequently reached in Gourmet, where the Court found that the 
prohibition on advertising at issue, even if it was non-discriminatory, had a particular effect 
on the cross-border supply of advertising space and thereby constituted a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 56  of the Treaty.195 This 
judgement can thus be held to confirm the ruling in Alpine Investments and the existence of 
a refined Keck principle in the field of services.  
 
Another case in which the defendant failed to invoke the derogation laid down in Keck is 
Bosman.196 The case concerned the transfer system in the football industry which required, 
when a player was transferred to another club, the payment of a compensation fee to the 
former club. These transfer rules applied to transfers of players between clubs within one 
Member State as well as from one Member State to another. Mr Bosman, a Belgian 
footballer wishing to move between clubs of different national associations, challenged the 
transfer rules under Article 45 TFEU as violating the free movement of workers. The Court 
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found it sufficient to note that, although the rules in issue in the main proceedings applied 
equally to all transfers, they still directly affected players' access to the employment market 
in other Member States and were thus capable of impeding freedom of movement for 
workers. Therefore, they could not be deemed comparable to the rules on selling 
arrangements for goods which in Keck were held to fall outside the ambit of Article 34 of 
the Treaty.197 Again, the Court focused on market access rather than on the formalistic 
wording of the Keck formula. 
 
Finally, the recently delivered judgement Mickelsson should be mentioned, where a 
Swedish prohibition of using personal watercraft (jet-ski) on waters other than general 
navigable waterways was challenged as constituting an infringement on the free movement 
on goods.198 Advocate General Kokott suggested that the prohibition, which could be 
characterized as an arrangement of use, should by analogy with the selling arrangements in 
Keck be excluded from the scope of Article 34 TFEU.199 The Court did however not adhere 
to this suggestion, but determined the case by reference to the market access criterion. 200 
The ruling clarifies that there is nothing particular about selling arrangements which 
motivates a different application of Article 34 TFEU. Unlike product regulations, they can 
simply not be presumed to impose a doub le burden on foreign operators and therefore, 
unless they are obviously discriminatory, they have to be scrutinized under another 
criterion, i.e. market access. The same holds true for arrangements of use and any other 
rules that are not product regulations. Consequently, also in the field of goods, the Court has 
shifted focus (or rather clarified it) from the type of measure to the effect on trade.201  
3.2.1.2 The de minimis test 
Alpine Investments, Bosman and Mickelsson can be held to confirm that the ECJ in fact has 
adopted a refined Keck principle with market access as the delimiting criterion. It is less 
apparent though whether the Court has made use of a de minimis test as suggested by 
Advocate General Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec. It can be held that the Court, when stating that the 
measures at issue directly affected access to the market of another Member State, introduced a 
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de minimis criterion of directness. This is further supported by cases where the measures at 
issue were found to fall outside the scope of the free movement provisions as their alleged 
restrictive effects were considered as being too uncertain and indirect for them to be regarded 
as being capable of hindering trade between Member States.202 However, none of these cases 
say much about the meaning of the criterion of directness and how to apply it. Does it mean 
that the impact of the national measure on market access has to be sufficiently great to trigger 
the application of the EC Treaty? Or does it refer to the cross-border nature of the 
restriction? 203 In Alpine Investments it seems as if the Court on the one hand put emphasis on 
the impact when stressing that the operators were deprived of a direct marketing technique 
and, on the other hand, highlighted the cross-border nature of the measure when underlining 
that the prohibition on cold calling was not confined within one Member State but also 
applied to offers made to recipients in other Member States.204  The latter view finds support 
in the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, where he held that while Keck concerned rules of 
the importing State relating to selling arrangements for the sale of goods in the territory of 
that State, Alpine Investments dealt with rules of the exporting State which required 
compliance not only for the provision of services in its own territory but also in the territory 
of other Member States.205 That view also fits well with the cases just mentioned were the 
measures were too uncertain and indirect to fall within the scope of the free movement 
provisions, since the license requirement in LIDL Italia, the entitlement to compensation on 
termination of employment in Graf and the requirement of patent holders to file a translation 
of their patents in the official language of the Member State concerned in BASF, where all 
regulations which applied solely within one Member state.206 However, this reasoning is in 
my view not satisfying, since a rule which actually does affect economic operators in other 
Member states should not be precluded from constituting a restriction simply because the rule 
is applied only within the territory of one Member State. In addition, such a view does not fit 
with the settled case- law derived from the Säger judgement. Perhaps the answer simply is that 
both the impact and the cross-border nature of the measure are relevant circumstances for the 
purposes of the de minimis test, given that they correspond to each other. If a measure is 
confined within one Member State it is less likely, but not excluded, that it will have a 
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substantial impact on the market access of another member state. This also seems to be the 
view taken by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in Leclerc-Siplec where he wants to 
include circumstances such as whether the effect of the measure is direct or indirect, 
immediate or remote, or purely speculative and uncertain as parts of the assessment whether 
the effect on market access is substantial. 207  
3.2.1.3 Towards a general obstacle test? 
Simultaneously as the period under which the cases just mentioned were delivered, a different 
line of case- law was developed where the Court merely concluded that an obstacle to free 
movement was at hand, without making use of a delimiting criterion such as market access. 
By simply declaring that the measure in issue rendered the free movement less attractive, 
seemingly any measure which to some degree decreased the economic profit or was otherwise 
inconvenient could fall within the scope of the free movement of persons and services. One 
such case is the above mentioned Carpenter case where the deportation of Mrs Carpenter, 
which hardly can be held to impede Mr Carpenter’s access to the market of other Member 
States, was considered as detrimental to the conditions under which Mr Carpenter exercised 
the freedom to provide services. Another is Pfeiffer Grosshandel,208 in which an Austrian 
prohibition on the subsidiary of a German undertaking from using a trade name already used 
in Germany by the parent company, which was substantially similar to the trade name of an 
Austrian competitor, was challenged under Article 49 TFEU. Although the prohibition was 
neither related to the taking-up of an economic activity, nor liable to discriminate, either 
directly or indirectly, against a person making use of the freedom of establishment, the Court 
classified it as a restriction. The rationale was that the prohibition could force the company 
group to adjust the presentation of the businesses they operated according to the place of 
establishment, thereby making the exercise of the freedom of establishment less attractive.209  
Concerns of this development were expressed by Advocate General Tizzano, who in his 
opinion in Caixa Bank advocated for a return to the market access model.210 Furthermore, he 
provided valuable guidance as to how to interpret the market access criterion. Firstly, the fact 
that other Member States apply less strict rules to providers of similar services established in 
their territory is not a sufficient reason for the purposes of that criterion. 211 Secondly, 
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measures that regulate the pursuit of an economic activity without discriminating in law and 
in fact between national and foreign operators cannot be regarded as directly affecting access 
to the market for the sole reason that they reduce the economic attractiveness of pursuing that 
activity.212 The Court seemed to adhere to Tizzano’s opinion and determined the case by 
reference to the market access criterion. 213 Given that the ECJ has used the market access 
criterion in numerous cases since,214 I am of the opinion that the general obstacle test has been 
abandoned and that market access at the present stage is the settled method for delimiting the 
scope of application as regards non-discriminatory measures. Arguably, the Court will 
continue to speak in terms of general obstacles, but only in so far as the existence of an 
obstacle is obvious, and use market access when the borderline is more difficult to draw. 
3.3 Discussion and conclusions 
Which one of these models that is preferable is noticeably a constitutional question, that is, 
whether you prefer a centralized or decent ralized Union order. In this context, centralization 
means that the regulatory competence to a greater extent is allocated to the Union, while 
decentralization means a system where most aspects of economic regulation are left to the 
Member States. The wider the scope given to the free movement provisions, the more 
centralized the Union system becomes.215 Hence, while the wider criterion of market access 
can be held to support the centralized approach, the narrower condition of discrimination 
rather works in favour of decentralization. I will not get any deeper into this polemic, but will 
confine myself to discuss which one of these models that is most suited for attaining a 
coherent case-law in line with the purposes of the Treaty provisions on free movement and the 
general principles of Union law. Then I will on the basis of the foregoing analysis determine 
which model that applies as case- law now stands.  
 
Both these models have their benefits and downsides. The differentiated interpretation takes 
better into account the complex nature of the service concept. Given the various legal areas 
and regulations that today are capable of triggering the application of Article 56 TFEU, it is 
not self-evident that all of them should be treated the same way. This is all the more true since 
the Treaty makers did probably not foresee the ECJ’s expanding interpretation, which has 
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made politically sensitive areas where the Member States traditionally have safe-guarded their 
autonomy, such as labour and tax law, subject to review by the ECJ.216 On the other hand, I 
find this model difficult to apply. Not only does it require a discrimination assessment, which, 
as is apparent from Chapter 3.1.1, can be quite a tricky task in itself, but also a classification 
of the measure as regulating the actual service activity or relating to service associated legal 
areas. As is apparent from the analysis above, it is far from always obvious to which category 
a measure should be attributed. Consequently, since, for one, the line of demarcation between 
indirectly and non-discriminatory measures is in practice far from being entirely clear and, for 
two, the classification of a measure as relating to the actual service activity or to service 
associated legal areas is by no means a simple one, to impose such delimitations of the scope 
of Article 56 TFEU would affect the legal certainty of operators.  
     Furthermore, the distinction between the actual service activity and service associated legal 
areas sometimes seems inadequate. One example to this is the above mentioned Breode case.  
One can ask oneself why a rule with the effect of prohibiting debt-collectors from carrying out 
judicial debt-collection work themselves should escape classification as a restriction just 
because it is found in the field of procedural law. Does it not in fact regulate the actual service 
activity? The same can be held in regard of labour law. Does, for instance, a requirement to 
pay certain minimum wages not regulate the conditions under which the service may be 
provided? It seems to me as if the differentiated interpretation seeks to restore the formalistic 
approach for which Keck has been so heavily criticized and which the Court since that 
judgement has been trying to depart from. In essence, it puts focus on the form of the measure 
and not on its effect. Arguably, this contravenes the very aim of the free movement provisions 
which allegedly is to prevent all unjustified obstacles, whatever their form, to inter-state trade. 
Similarly, the use of a discrimination test can be questioned in the light of that aim. As AG 
Jacobs held in Leclerc Siplec, if an obstacle to inter-State trade exists, it cannot cease to exist 
simply because an identical obstacle affects domestic trade. 217    
     It follows, that the differentiated interpretation can be criticized for jeopardizing the legal 
certainty of operators and for contravening the aim of the free movement provisions.  
     Even though the model based on market access and a de minimis test also has been held 
difficult to apply,218 it is in my opinion much less confusing than the differentiated 
interpretation.  Grey zones are inevitable, but they will arguably be fewer if national measures 
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are scrutinized under a single test of uniform application. The exclusion of non-discriminatory 
measures in the field of service associated legal areas from the scope of application would 
supposedly only lead to contrived double burden reasoning or the gradual imposition of 
derogations, like the one on advertising. As far as I am concerned, this would make the scope 
of application of Article 56 TFEU more unpredictable than the test based on market access. 
Consequently, the market access model dos not only fit better with the aim of the Treaty as it 
focuses on the effect of the measure, but it is also a more appropriate means for ensuring the 
legal certainty of operators. 
     Surely, it can be argued that the market access model could lead to a pre-Keck scenario, 
where the most far-fetched challenges will be brought before the national courts, and even to 
a race to the bottom. However, with a de minimis test preventing measures with too slight an 
impact on inter-state trade from passing the threshold, such a development can allegedly be 
avoided. It should also be recalled that the fact that some Member States may apply stricter 
rules than others is not in itself sufficient for Article 56 TFEU to come into play. Therefore I 
believe that the fear of a race to the bottom is unfounded or at least exaggerated. 
     In view of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the model based on market access should 
apply. That said, the question remains which one of these models that has been embraced by 
the ECJ. Of course, the two models do not exclude one another. It would be possible to apply 
a pure discrimination approach as regards service associated legal areas and use market access 
as the delimiting criterion when it comes to the actual service activity. However, I do not 
believe that that is the model employed by the Court thus far or is prepared to introduce in the 
future. When analysing the Court’s case- law it can be concluded that it is in the field of tax 
law that the differentiated interpretation finds its strongest support. In this field it seems, at 
first sight, as if the Court has applied a pure discrimination approach. However, as Advocate 
General Tizzano pointed out in Hünermund, a tax measure which only affects the economic 
attractiveness of providing services is not such as to affect market access. Therefore, such a 
measure must be discriminatory in order to fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU. Hence, 
what appears to be a sole application of a prohibition on discrimination can also be explained 
by reference to the criterion of market access. Furthermore, the market access model fits 
better into the Court’s general terminology as regards the classification of a measure as 
discriminatory or not. According to the differentiated interpretation, the difference between 
indirectly and non-discriminatory measures is crucial. However, that is not how the ECJ 
seems to look at it. On the contrary, the Court usually merely distinguishes between directly 
discriminatory and indistinctly applicable measures, where the latter is a generic term for 
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indirectly as well as non-discriminatory measures. Hence, the Court treats indirectly and non-
discriminatory measures the same and generally uses market access as the delimiting criterion 
in both cases219 and – due to the reasons outlined above – rightly so.  
3.4 Market access and collective action 
If we assume that market access is the relevant delimiting criterion, it must be determined 
how this criterion relates to collective action. In other words, can collective action be 
considered liable to directly affect the access to the market of another Member State so as to 
fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU? As is evident from Laval, the answer is affirmative.  
The same was proven valid with regard to Article 49 TFEU, i.e. establishments, in Viking. 
The Court seemingly used the broad ‘general obstacle test’ as it concluded that the collective 
action in the respective main proceedings was liable to make the exercise of the freedoms less 
attractive.220 These findings have caused scholars to believe that all collective action is liable 
to constitute an impediment on the freedom of movement.221 However, the Court’s concern 
was presumably that the collective actions at issue affected Viking’s and Laval’s access to the 
markets of other Member States. In Laval, the access to the Swedish market had been made 
conditional on signing the collective agreement for the building sector and completing wage 
negotiations with the relevant trade union.  222  In Viking, the access to the Estonian market 
had in practice become subject to the relevant trade unions’ consent.223 Given the obvious 
existence of restrictions, the Court found supposedly no need to engage in a more careful 
market access analysis.224 Consequently, these cases do not mean that the Court returned to a 
general obstacle test with the consequence that all collective action with cross-border 
implications will be caught by the freedoms of movement. As the Court held in Viking, it 
cannot be considered inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights and the right to take 
collective action that those freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree.225 Hence, the 
Court made clear that there may be collective action which will fall outside the scope of the 
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free movement provisions. This brings us to the question of how the criterion of market 
access will relate to collective action that is neither aimed at, nor have the effect of, adversely 
affecting cross-border situations as compared to internal ones. The answer will most likely not 
be the same in every case, but will depend on the character of collective action in issue. If we 
use the wage strike against a service providing company with business in other Member 
States as an example, such an action in practice prevents the provision of services in the home 
state as well as in potential host states for an indefinite time. An employer is, especially in the 
field of services, dependent on the staff’s performances. Hence, if the employees suspend 
their work, no services can be provided, neither within, nor outside the Member State. 
Consequently, such an action has a substantial impact on the access to the markets of other 
Member States, since it directly impedes the ability to provide cross-border services. 
Therefore it can be regarded as directly affecting access to the markets of other Member 
States. When looking at the example of a strike against a subcontractor in the host state on 
whom an operator providing services in that state is dependent, the answer might be different. 
It can be held that the strike affects the market access in that it makes it more difficult, 
expensive and time-consuming to penetrate the market of the host state. However, it may be 
that the restrictive effects of such an action would be considered as too uncertain and indirect 
for it to fall within the scope of Article 56 TFEU.  Unlike the former example, the provision 
of cross-border services will not be prevented, only obstructed. Hence, the effects are not as 
severe and will depend on, for instance, the possibility to find other subcontractors.226 
Consequently, such an action is less likely to be considered as directly affecting access to the 
market of another Member State. In most cases it would arguably rather be seen a commercial 
risk which has to be accounted for in business than a restriction on free movement. In any 
event, the question whether non-discriminatory collective action is liable directly to affect 
market access cannot be answered generally, but has to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. It is however submitted that, although impediments on inter-state trade may not be 
inherent in the very exercise of the right to take collective action, the market access test will 
bring a great number of actions within the scope of Article 56 TFEU. Perhaps that is one of 
the reasons why Advocate General Maduro in his opinion in Viking suggested a somewhat 
different test, namely one that can be described as a qualified market access test applicable to 
private measures. He stressed that when a measure that originates from private actors is liable 
to cause disruptions to trade, the market will often “take care of it”. 227 Therefore, such 
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measures should only be considered as restrictions within the meaning of the free movement 
provisions when they are capable of restricting others from exercising their right to freedom 
of movement, by raising an obstacle that they cannot reasonably circumvent228. 
Consequently, the Advocate General linked the question of whether there is a restriction at 
hand to the question of horizontal direct effect. Even though he had a point in considering 
these two questions together – it is not self-evident that private measures should be treated the 
same as statal ones – I find it difficult to see the material difference between this test the 
ordinary de minimis test. In both cases, the result would probably be that the wage strike 
against a service provider with business in several Member States would be caught by Article 
56 TFEU, while the strike against a subcontractor would not, since the latter but not the 
former would raise an obstacle that cannot reasonably be circumvented. Be that as it may, the 
Court did not adhere to the Advocate General’s suggestion, but dealt with these issues 
separately. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Court is not prepared to mitigate the 
application of the market access test to collective action.  
 
 
                                                 
228 The Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-438/05 Viking, para. 48. 
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4. Horizontal direct effect – applying Article 56 TFEU to trade 
unions 
Another circumstance which has to be taken into account when answering the question 
whether non-discriminatory collective action is caught by Article 56 TFEU is that that 
provision is addressed to the Member States, while collective action is taken by trade unions, 
i.e. private parties. Does this fact exclude collective action from the application of Article 56 
TFEU? In Laval the ECJ answered that question in the negative.229 The same conclusion was 
reached in Viking in regard of Article 49 TFEU, governing the freedom of establishment.230 
Hence, the Court applied Article 56 and 49 TFEU horizontally and imposed on trade unions 
the obligation to respect free movement. This raises questions such as whether the same 
conclusion is valid for all collective action or if it was merely a result of the particular facts in 
those cases. Does the non-discriminatory character of the action in issue make any difference? 
In order to answer these questions an analysis is required of cases where the ECJ has applied 
the provisions of free movement to measures of private parties. Normally, such measures are 
excluded from the application of the Treaty provisions on free movement and are instead 
governed by the competition rules in Article 101 and 102 TFEU. However, three main 
situations when the Court has deviated from this principle can be outlined in case-law.231 
Firstly, the conduct of private parties has been caught by the free movement provisions when 
the state has failed to adopt adequate measures to prevent obstacles to free movement 
resulting from that conduct.232 In such cases it is not really a matter of horizontal direct effect, 
but a vertical application to the state’s non-action. This has also been described as indirect 
horizontal effect.233 Secondly, private parties have become subject to the free movement 
provisions when the rule or measure in issue were aimed at collectively regulating gainful 
employment or services.234 This is sometimes referred to as semi-horizontal direct effect.235 
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Finally, genuinely horizontal situations have been caught by the provisions on free 
movement.236 I will briefly analyze these forms of horizontal applications in turn. Not only 
cases in the field of services will be dealt with, but also cases in the other free movement 
areas insofar as they are relevant for understanding the Court’s reasoning in Viking and Laval. 
Subsequently, I will more carefully analyze the application of Article 49 and 56 TFEU to 
trade unions in Viking and Laval in order to answer the questions asked above. Finally, I will 
make some remarks on the implications of the case- law on goods.    
4.1 Indirect horizontal effect 
The concept of indirect horizontal effect was introduced in a goods context in the so called 
angry farmers-case.237 In this case, the French authorities were held responsible for violent 
acts committed by private individuals and by protest movements of French farmers directed 
against agricultural products from other Member States. The Court’s motivation was 
straightforward and pragmatic – the fact that a Member State abstains from taking action to 
prevent obstacles to the free movement is just as likely to obstruct intra-Union trade as is a 
positive act. Therefore, and on basis of the loyalty obligation laid down in Article 4(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU),238 the Court concluded that the Member States are required 
to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that the fundamental freedoms are 
respected on their territory. 239 The same solution was subsequently applied in Schmidberger, 
in which obstacles to the free movement of goods created by an environmental demonstration 
on a major transit route entailed state liability. 240 Notably, there is a crucial difference 
between this indirect form of horizontal application and a semi- or genuinely horizontal one, 
in that the former targets the (non-)action of a state while the two latter are directly applied to 
the actions of private parties.  In fact, the Court has consistently refused to directly apply the 
Treaty provisions on goods to private parties, the rationale being that the conduct of private 
parties is dealt with under the competition rules.241 However, as far as I am aware, there has 
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never occurred a situation in the goods context which could have entailed a semi-horizontal 
application because of the rules’ collective ly regulatory character. Therefore, one cannot 
definitely exclude the possibility of a semi-horizontal application of Article 34 TFEU.   
     So far, the Angry Farmers or Schmidberger solution has never been applied to services. 
Still, there is nothing to preclude such an application. The argument that a state’s non-action 
is just as likely to obstruct intra-Union trade as is a positive act is equally valid with regard to 
services. So is the argument based on Article 4(3) TEU.242 This solution also seems to have 
inspired the drafters of the Service directive, which compels on the Member States to insure 
that the recipient is not made subject to discriminatory requirements based on his nationality 
or place of residence.243 However, what kinds of actions by private parties that a Member 
State is required to prevent is not entirely clear. Is it only discriminatory measures as the 
service directive seems to suggest? Or is it the same acts as the Member State itself is 
prohibited from committing, that is, all measures which directly affects market access to 
another Member State? When considering the outcome in Schmidberger it certainly seems so, 
since the actions of the private parties in that case can be characterized as a non-
discriminatory impediment to inter-state trade which nevertheless affected transportation 
companies’ access to the markets of other Member States.244 In effect, this judgment creates 
an indirect obligation on private parties to comply with Union law which goes further than the 
direct obligation resulting from the genuinely and semi-horizontal effect.  
4.2 Semi-horizontal  direct effect 
In a number of cases, starting with Walrave, the ECJ has applied the provisions on free 
movement of persons and services to rules originating from private organs aimed at 
regulating gainful employment or the provision of services in a collective manner.245 This 
somewhat vague concept has never been promptly clarified by the Court. However, when 
studying these cases one can identify some common features as regards the nature of the rules 
in issue. Characteristic is that they are all private legislation- like regulations which put the 
individual in a position vis-av-vis the private body not unlike that vis-à-vis the state. For 
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instance, rules laid down by sporting organizations 246 and Bars247 determining the conditions 
under which sportsmen and advocates may pursue their respective activities have been caught 
by this concept. Seemingly, the private body must have a certain importance in the sector 
concerned for it to be considered as possessing sufficient power to impede the free 
movement.248 One main argument for including such rules within the Treaty provisions on 
free movement of persons and workers was that the abolition of State barriers could otherwise 
be neutralized by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations 
or organizations not governed by public law. A second essential argument was that Member 
States which choose to regulate working conditions by law should not be put in a less 
favourable position than Member States in which those conditions are governed by 
agreements and other acts concluded or adopted by private persons.249 Consequently, it was 
not a matter of genuinely horizontal application, but an extended vertical or semi-horizontal 
one, introduced in order to ensure the full effectiveness (effet utile) and to maintain the 
uniform application of Union law.250  
     In early case- law, semi-horizontal application was confined to situations of 
discrimination. 251 However, this case- law predates the Säger judgment by several years and 
has been modified in subsequent cases. Hence, in Bosman and Lehtonen the Court applied 
Article 45 TFEU to rules laid down by sport organizations governing transfers of players, 
which applied equally or even stricter to domestic situations.252 The same was held to apply in 
regard of services. Consequently, it can be concluded from these cases that semi-horizontal 
application of the Treaty provisions of persons as well as services does not require 
discrimination. 253 In my view, this is the only tenable conclusion, since the opposite 
application would be to put Member States which choose to regulate working conditions by 
law in stead of by agreements in a less favourable position, contrary to the logics behind 
Walrave. 
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4.3 Genuinely horizontal direct effect 
The Court took the concept of horizontal direct effect even further in Angonese254 and applied 
Article 45 TFEU to what has been held to constitute a genuinely horizontal situation.255 The 
case concerned the requirement of a private bank for job applicants to produce a certificate of 
bilingualism issued by the local authority after an examination that had to take place in the 
province of Bolzano (Italy). Consequently, the certificate was more difficult for persons 
residing outside that province to attain. On the basis of this requirement the bank denied Mr 
Angonese, who lacked the relevant certificate but was impeccably bilingual, to take part in the 
competition for employment in the bank. As a consequence, Mr Angonese challenged the 
bank’s requirement as infringing the free movement of workers. The Court started by citing 
Walrave and the “collective regulation formula” as well as the underlying reasons of effet 
utile and uniform application of Union law.256 When reading these paragraphs alone one 
could get the impression that the Court was still confined within the area of semi-horizontal 
application. However, the Court proceeded by referring to the Defrenne case in which the 
concept of horizontal direct effect of Treaty provisions initially was introduced. 257 In that 
case, the Court declared that since Article 157 TFEU is mandatory in nature, the prohibition 
on discrimination between men and women applies not only to the action of public 
authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour 
collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.258  In Angonese, the Court held that 
such considerations must also be applicable to Article 45 TFEU, which lays down a 
fundamental freedom and which constitutes a specific application of the general prohibition of 
discrimination contained in Article 18 TFEU. Consequently, the Court concluded that the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article 45 TFEU must be 
regarded as applying to private persons as well.259  
      I would like to make two remarks in this context. Firstly, despite the fact that the Court 
refers to Walrave, the case should not be attributed to that line of case- law. In my opinion, it 
can scarcely be argued that a private bank has such collective regulating power over a sector 
or profession so as to fulfill the requirement of `regulating working conditions in a collective 
manner´.260 Rather the case should be seen as dealing with a contract between individuals of a 
                                                 
254 Case C-281/98 Angonese.  
255 See e.g. Barnard, p. 284 f. and Szyszczak and Cygan, p.159.  
256 Case C-281/98 Angonese, paras 31-33. 
257 Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aérienne [1976] ECR 455. 
258 Ibid., para. 39. 
259 Case C-281/98 Angonese, paras 34-36. 
260 In support of this view, see Öberg, p. 801 f. 
 54 
non-collective character, as was the case in Defrenne. Given the emphasis the Court put on 
the Defrenne judgement, this is also how the Court seemed to look at it. Accordingly, the ECJ 
went beyond a semi-horizontal application and gave Article 45 TFEU a genuinely horizontal 
direct effect. Secondly, the case can only be considered to confirm such effect in regard of 
discriminatory measures.261 This follows from the wording of paragraphs 34-36 of the 
judgment, in which the Court explicitly derives the horizontal effect of Article 45 TFEU from 
the general prohibition on discrimination laid down in Article 18 TFEU.  
   Whether a genuinely horizontal application is possible also in the field of services is 
uncertain, but there is much to indicate that so is the case. For starters, the ECJ seems 
generally not to make any difference between Article 45 and 56 TFEU with regard to their 
effect, as analogies are frequently made between them.262 Furthermore, the argument of effet 
utile and uniform application of Union law should have the same value and importance with 
respect to the free movement of services as to the free movement of workers.263 Finally, just 
like Article 45 TFEU, Article 56 lays down a fundamental freedom and a specific application 
of the general prohibition on discrimination.  
4.4 Legal analysis of the application of Article 49 and 56 TFEU to trade unions in 
Viking and Laval 
In the following section I will analyse the legal base for the outcome in Viking and Laval and 
its anchoring in previous case- law. The purpose is to determine the chosen form of horizontal 
application in order to make conclusions on the practical and legal scope of the judgements. I 
will mainly, but not exclusively, refer to the Court’s reasoning in Viking, where the question 
of horizontal direct effect was explicitly referred to the Court. So was not the case in Laval 
and, as a consequence, the judgment is somewhat fuzzier on that point. The outcome and 
underlying reasoning were in any event the same, whereby it can be assumed that the 
conclusions in Viking bear relevance for the application of Article 56 TFEU.  
4.4.1 The form of horizontal application employed by the ECJ  
So to which one of the above mentioned forms of horizontal effect is the application of the 
Treaty provisions on free movement to trade unions in Viking and Laval attributable? As 
regards the first form, i.e. indirect horizontal effect, it should be noted that the Court found in 
Laval that it was the right of trade unions to take collective action – not the action as such – 
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that constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services.264 This indicates that the 
claims should have been directed against the Member State for granting that right and not 
against the trade union. However, this finding is more than a little confusing since the Court 
subsequently scrutinized the trade union’s exercise of that right – not the right as such -  when 
it came to the question of justification. 265 A similar curiosity is found in Viking, where the 
Court cited Angry Farmers and Schmidberger, in which the free movement provisions were 
invoked against Member states, in support of the conclusion that Article 49 TFEU may be 
relied upon against trade unions.266 This reference also signals that the defendant should 
actually have been the Member State and not the trade unions. Still, the indirect form of 
horizontal application can undoubtedly be ruled out. Despite the statements just mentioned, 
the Court did indeed apply Article 49 and 56 TFEU to the trade unions’ actions and not to the 
Member State’s failure to prevent the obstacles to free movement created by those actions. 
Therefore, the horizontal application was direct - not indirect. The Court’s reference to Angry 
Farmers and Schmidberger was arguably an attempt to bring the four freedoms together by 
signalling that the indirect horizontal effect applied in relation to goods does not differ in 
substance, merely in form, to the semi-horizontal application used in relation to persons. At 
least, this was the view of Advocate General Maduro, who held that the substance of the 
problem - how to reconcile Viking Line’s rights to freedom of movement with the rights to 
associate and to strike of the FSU and the ITF – would remain the same regardless of against 
whom the claims were directed.267 I am sure however that the Swedish building trade union 
(Byggnads), who was recently found liable for damages in the proceedings before the national 
court, would not agree as to the immaterialness of this difference.268 Furthermore, the private 
or statal origin of the rule was in fact proven crucial for the assessment of justification in 
Viking and Laval.269  
      As for the two other forms of horizontal direct effects, the cases are more difficult to 
place. The distinction is nonetheless important since only the genuine form of horizontal 
application requires discrimination. In Viking the Court started by repeating the general 
reasons for including restrictions imposed by private bodies within the free movement 
provision, namely that the abolition of barriers to trade otherwise could be neutralized.270 
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Since this argument is valid for both genuinely and semi-horizontal application and was used 
in the Walrave line of case- law as well as in Angonese, it does not say much about the 
intended form of horizontal application. The Court then continued by declaring that the 
prohibition on prejudicing a fundamental freedom laid down in a provision of the Treaty that 
is mandatory in nature applies in particular to all agreements intended to regulate paid labour 
collectively, referring to paragraph 39 in Defrenne.271 This reference to a case which 
concerned a private contractual relationship can be interpreted as though a genuinely 
horizontal effect was intended. However, too far-reaching conclusions should not be drawn 
from this reference. The citation of Defrenne is not surprising, since paragraph 39 in that 
judgement, unlike the more general collective regulation formula in Walrave, specifically 
relates to collective agreements. It should also be noted that the Court left out the second part 
of paragraph 39 regarding `contracts between individuals´ and that it did not refer to 
Angonese. Consequently, there is nothing in this reference to imply a genuinely horizontal 
application. The Court thereafter went on to apply Article 49 TFEU to the facts of the case 
and found that the collective action taken by FSU and ITF was aimed at the conclusion of an 
agreement which was meant to regulate the work of Viking’s employees collectively, and, 
that those two trade unions were organisations which were not public law entities but 
exercised the legal autonomy conferred on them, inter alia, by national law. 272 A similar 
wording was used in Laval.273 Therefore Article 49 and 56 TFEU was to be interpreted as 
meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the respective main proceedings, could be 
relied on by a private undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions.274 
Hence, the Court explicitly applied the collective regulation requirement laid down in 
Walrave, which suggests that it was a matter of semi-horizontal application. Nevertheless, it 
has been argued that since the ECJ clearly stated that it does not regard unions as public 
bodies it made clear that the effect was genuinely horizontal. 275 I do not agree with this 
argument. Conversely, the Court emphasized in Viking that the semi-horizontal effect is not 
dependent on the quasi-public character of the body in issue.276 Consequently, that argument 
is based on a misinterpretation of the collective regulation requirement. I will return to this 
below.   
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4.4.2 The interpretation of the collective regulation formula 
As follows from the foregoing, I am of the view that the Court applied a semi-horizontal 
effect in Viking and Laval. Also the arguments of the parties, the Commission and the 
intervening Member States were confined within the framework of semi-horizontal 
application. The main issue was how to interpret the collective regulation requirement and 
whether this was fulfilled by the trade unions and collective agreements in issue. There was 
an evident dividing line between the opinions of the new and the old Member States. The 
view that Article 49 and 56 TFEU are directly applicable also to trade unions was upheld 
straightforwardly by new Member States such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and 
Poland, while old Member States such as Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Germany 
and Sweden took the opposing view. 277 The main argument of Viking and the new Member 
States was that in Scandinavia, it is collective agreements rather than legislation that regulate 
pay and working conditions. Even though trade unions may not by themselves lay down rules 
in a collective manner, as is the case with the professional associations in Walrave and 
Bosman, their action de facto have this effect. Therefore, the collective bargaining agreements 
entered into by the FSU do regulate employment in a collective manner. The same holds true 
for the ITF circular which the members, in accordance with the principle of solidarity and on 
pain of penalties, are bound to give effect to. By contrast, The ITF, the FSU and the old 
Member States, supported by the Commission, held that industrial action does not involve 
measures designed to collectively regulate establishment and services. Trade unions merely 
have the right to negotiate, not to specify terms with which an employer must comply. 
Therefore, they cannot be compared to the quasi-public bodies in Walrave and Bosman, 
particularly not the ITF whose circular’s effectiveness is entirely dependent on the solidarity 
between its members. The FSU also argued in more general terms that to apply horizontal 
direct effect to collective agreements would open the floodgates. Since there are major 
differences among the Member States’ social models and collective bargaining systems, every 
collective agreement could not be characterised as having the regulatory effect required to fall 
within the scope of the free movement provisions. This would not only lead to severe 
application problems as to which criteria that should be determinative in distinguishing 
regulatory agreements, but also to endless references from national courts to the ECJ asking 
whether specific collective agreements possesses regulatory effect. 
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      The Court rejected the arguments of the unions and the old Member States and found, as 
mentioned above, that the collective action taken by FSU and ITF was aimed at the 
conclusion of an agreement which was meant to regulate the work of Viking’s employees 
collectively. It further added that there is no indication in the Walrave line of case- law that 
could validly support the view that it applies only to associations or to organisations 
exercising a regulatory task or having quasi- legislative powers. Moreover, the Court pointed 
out that, in exercising their autonomous power, pursuant to their trade union rights, to 
negotiate with employers or professional organisations the conditions of employment and pay 
of workers, trade unions participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate paid 
work collectively.278 
     The Court’s statements demonstrate that the old Member States wrongly focused on 
whether trade unions are regulatory or quasi-public bodies. That is not the essence in the 
Walrave doctrine, even though the bodies in that case- law could be characterized as such. By 
emphasizing that it is sufficient for the application of the Walrave doctrine that trade unions 
participate in the drawing up of agreements seeking to regulate paid work collectively, the 
Court made clear that it does not require that the private body has the power to independently 
adopt rules relating to working conditions or the provision of services.  
      Despite the criticism of several scholars,279 the outcomes were in my view consistent with 
the general approach employed by the ECJ with regard to horizontal direct effect and in that 
sense no surprise. The judgements had a firm legal base in preceding case-law and in the 
principles of effet utile and the uniform application of Union law. Those principles were 
arguably the very reasons for introducing the concept of direct effect in the first place.280 
Naturally, the Court could not jeopardize the practical effect of those principles by letting 
private parties exercise the autonomous power conferred on them by Member States beyond 
reach of Union law. Whether that autonomous power consists in the ability to independently 
adopt rules aimed at collectively regulating employment or the permission to take collective 
action in order to enforce such rules does just not seem relevant. They both constitute an equal 
threat to the effectiveness and the uniform application of Union law. It is true that the 
formulation ‘rules’ and ‘regulating’ have a quasi-statal ring, but as Snell rightly points out, the 
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whole system of free movement law is based on the effect on a measure, not on its form.281 
Hence, the fact that the measures in Viking and Laval took the form of actions instead of rules 
did and should not remove them from the ambit of free movement, as their effects on inter-
state trade were just as severe. 
     Another objection made by some scholars is that in the preceding case- law, the horizontal 
direct effect operated to defend the rights of workers, whereas in Viking and Laval, it was 
used against them.282 However, this argument does no bear scrutiny in the light of the aim and 
purpose of the free movement provisions. These provisions are only concerned with the rights 
of workers in so far as they are deprived of their right to free movement. Hence, it is the 
freedom of movement, not the rights of workers, that the Treaty freedoms are aimed to 
protect. Obviously, this aim remains the same irrespective of the statal or private origin of a 
restriction.283 
4.5 General consequences of Viking and Laval for the applicability of Article 56 
TFEU to trade unions 
As follows from the foregoing, trade unions may, by virtue of their autonomous power to 
participate in the drawing up of collective agreements, become subject to the Treaty 
provisions on free movement. Whether this applies in every situation, or rather, to every 
collective agreement is, however, uncertain. As the FSU pointed out, the Member States’ 
collective bargaining systems differ and it might not be that every collective agreement could 
be considered as possessing regulatory effect. For instance, in the UK, collective agreements 
are not legally enforceable and are relatively sparse in their coverage of the workforce.284 It 
has been held that it would therefore seem absurd to treat them the same as erga omnes 
collective agreements.285 I, on the other hand, am doubtful as to the validity of this reasoning. 
The Walrave formula only requires that the rules are aimed at collective regulation. In Viking, 
an even looser formulation was used, namely that the agreement seek to regulate paid work 
collectively. Is it not so that collective agreements always are aiming at, or seeking to, 
regulate working conditions collectively, regardless of whether they are legally enforceable or 
not? And is it not so that even though a collective agreement is sparse in its coverage, it still 
targets collective, as opposed to individual, regulation? The legal nature of the agreement and 
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its coverage rather refers to how effective it is in attaining that aim, but that should have no 
bearing for the purposes of determining the aim as such. Consequently, I find it likely that 
Article 49 and 56 TFEU can be applied to collective action taken by trade unions even when 
the collective agreement in issue is not binding and when its coverage is comparatively 
sparse.286 However, since collective agreements in both Sweden and Finland are binding upon 
the parties once adopted and the coverage is extensive, the Court did not have to take a stance 
in this issue. Therefore the question remains uncertain. In any event, I believe that the 
misgivings about endless references to the ECJ concerning specific collective agreements are 
unfounded, or at least exaggerated. Firstly, the action must pass the legality review against 
national law before a reference to the ECJ becomes relevant. In the UK, for instance, the right 
to take collective action is quite restrained and it would be pointless to refer a case to the 
Court if the action was deemed illegal according to British law. 287 Secondly, even though the 
systems of the Member States differ, they can be grouped into a limited number of models, at 
least as regards the effect of collective agreements. 288 Hence, a review of each and every 
agreement would not be necessary. 
     In conclusion, I believe that most collective agreements within the bargaining systems of 
the EU would be considered to fulfil the collective regulation requirement. In turn, most 
collective action (provided that it passes the threshold for constituting a restriction) is liable to 
fall foul to the free movement of services. This should apply equally to discriminatory as well 
as non-discriminatory collective action, since discrimination is not a prerequisite for the 
application of the collective regulation requirement. This conclusion is further supported by 
Advocate General Mengozzi who in his opinion in Laval stressed that, since the line of 
demarcation between indirect discrimination and non-discriminatory restrictions is far from 
being entirely clear, to impose such a delimitation of the horizontal scope of Article 56 TFEU 
would affect the legal certainty of operators.289 Consequently, the answer to the question 
asked initially in this chapter is that Article 56 TFEU may be relied upon against trade unions 
when they are taking non-discriminatory collective action. 290  
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     There is of course the possibility to interpret Viking and Laval more narrowly and argue 
that the ECJ based its rulings mainly on account of the circumstances of these particular cases 
in an attempt to provide a pragmatic solution. Following these logics, the reasoning in those 
cases cannot unreservedly be transferred to cases where the incentives for the ECJ to adopt 
such a solution are not as strong. In this context, it should be recalled that a prerequisite for 
the application of the Walrave doctrine is that the private body in issue enjoys autonomous 
power. Given the considerable autonomy granted to both sides of industry in the Scandinavian 
model of collective employment relations,291 it can be argued that the outcome would be 
different in a case characterized by a national context where the autonomy of trade unions is 
more limited. In particular, when considering the responsibility conferred on Swedish trade 
unions to ensure that posted workers enjoy minimum wages as established by the PWD, it is 
not surprising that those unions were treated as a Member State with regard to the direct effect 
of the Treaty. 292 Consequently, one can contend that the conclusions in the Laval judgement 
cannot be extended to private measures which do not include the involvement of private 
parties in the implementation of a directive. In such cases, it can be argued that the dispute 
should rather be resolved by way of the Schmidberger solution whereby the focus would shift 
towards the legality of the national framework in which the action is protected.293 Last but not 
least, it can of course be alleged that the conclusions in Viking with regard to establishments 
cannot automatically be transposed to the service field.   
     However, these arguments are in my opinion not convincing. As far as autonomy is 
concerned suffice it to say that the right to take collective action constitutes an autonomous 
power which should be a sufficient power per se. Since the exercise of that power by itself is 
capable of effectively restricting free movement, the degree of autonomous powers in general 
does simply not seem material. As to the Posted Workers Directive, it is true that the 
incentives to apply Article 56 TFEU to trade unions in Laval were principally strong because 
of the regulatory task given to those unions. However, as the Court clarified in Viking, the 
exercise of a regulatory task is not a requirement for the application of the Walrave 
doctrine,294 and therefore the argument can be rejected. Finally, as regards the question 
whether the conclusions in Viking can be transposed to the service field, it must be borne in 
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mind that those conclusions were in fact made by analogy from cases in the field of services 
and workers. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that those conclusions are not as valid 
with regard to collective action restricting the free movement of services as they are to those 
obstructing the freedom of establishment. 
     To sum up, it must be submitted that a narrow interpretation of the implications of Viking 
and Laval is possible, but that there is more to indicate a broader interpretation of the legal 
and practical scope of those judgements. Conclusively, Article 56 TFEU is in my view 
capable of catching collective action taken by trade unions, irrespective of the non-binding 
character and sparse coverage of the collective agreement it is seeking to enforce, regardless 
of its non-discriminatory character and in spite of a more limited trade union autonomy than 
the Scandinavian one.  
4.6 Implications of the case-law on goods 
Finally, I would like to make some remarks on the possible implications of the case- law on 
goods for the applicability of Article 56 TFEU to trade unions. As mentioned in chapter 4.1, 
the Court has consistently refused to give the Treaty provisions on goods horizontal direct 
effect. To say the least, it would be somewhat peculiar if the right to take collective action 
would be dependent on whether the action was directed against a service or a goods providing 
company. As case- law now stands, the former action will be caught by the prohibition against 
restrictions on the free movement of services and have to be justified against imperative 
requirements in the public interest, while the latter will escape the ambit of free movement. 
On the one hand, it can be asserted that the ECJ has deliberately separated between the 
freedoms as far as their effects are concerned, as it scarcely can be argued that the Court was 
unaware of the possible application differences that could follow. On the other hand, it is not 
impossible that the Court, when an opportunity is given, will bring the freedoms together and 
give Article 34 TFEU a semi-horizontal direct effect. As pointed out above, no such 
opportunity has thus far appeared and I can see no reason why the collective regulation 
requirement laid down in Walrave should not apply to collective action directed against a 
company dealing with goods. Furthermore, since collective agreements, by virtue of the 
Albany judgement295, have been removed from the Treaty competition rules, the argument that 
the conduct of private parties is primarily governed by those rules bears no scrutiny with 
regard to such agreements. Moreover, should the Court choose not to give Article 34 TFEU a 
semi-horizontal effect, the possibility remains to use the Schmidberger solution to collective 
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action directed against goods companies and thereby indirectly subjecting trade unions to 
Article 34 TFEU. However, to analyze the possib ility to apply Article 34 TFEU to trade 
unions any further falls outside the scope of this essay. In any event, I do not believe that the 
refusal hitherto to apply Article 34 TFEU horizontally will exclude Article 56 TFEU from 
being applied to trade unions when taking non-discriminatory action, just as it did not 
preclude that provision from applying to the collective action taken in Laval. Consequently, 
the jurisprudence revolved around Article 34 TFEU will seemingly not implicate the 
application of Article 56 TFEU. Conversely, I find it more likely that the case- law on Article 
56 will implicate the effect of Article 34.  
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5. Striking a balance between the freedom of movement and the 
right to collective action 
 
Throughout the last decade the ECJ has usually referred to the four freedoms as fundamental 
principles and foundations of Union law.296 Simultaneously, it has placed an increasing focus 
on human rights and underlined their status as general principles of Union law.297 Hence, in 
Viking and Laval, the Court recognised the right to take collective action, including the right 
to strike, as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of those principles.298 In many 
cases the fundamental rights have complemented or even enhanced the enforcement of the 
fundamental freedoms. In Viking and Laval, however, the Court was faced with a conflict 
between them and it thus had to strike a balance between economic freedoms on the one hand 
and social policy objectives on the other. The aim of this chapter is to provide a legal analysis 
on how to solve such conflicts, or more particularly, the conflict between the freedom to 
provide services and the right to collective action. My main focus will lie on the solutions 
chosen in Viking and Laval, but since these cases was influenced by the Schmidberger299 and 
Omega300 judgements, in which the ECJ previously had been given the task to reconcile 
fundamental rights and free movement, I will start by reproducing the facts and the reasoning 
of the ECJ in those.   
5.1 Schmidberger and Omega 
The Schmidberger case, closely followed by Omega, is the first case where there Court had to 
deal with an apparent conflict between a fundamental freedom, i.e. the free movement of 
goods, and a fundamental right, namely the freedom of assembly and expression. The case 
concerned a demonstration organized by an environmental group on the main transit route 
linking Germany to Italy, resulting in the closure of the Brenner motorway for nearly 30 
hours. The applicant, an international transport undertaking based in Germany, brought an 
action against the Austrian authorities for allowing the demonstration, claiming that it 
prevented their transportations to Italy, thus constituting a restriction on the free movement of 
goods. After finding that the failure to ban the demonstration amounted to a measure of 
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equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction, the Court stated that fundamental rights form an 
integral part of the general principles of law and that measures which are incompatible with 
the observance of human rights are thus not acceptable in the Community. Therefore, the 
protection of those rights was declared a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a 
restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, even under a fundamental freedom 
guaranteed by the Treaty such as the free movement of goods.301 The Court continued by 
stressing that the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights, more particularly the 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the 
ECHR, thus needed to be reconciled with those arising from a fundamental freedom enshrined 
in the Treaty. The Court then held that neither the free movement of goods, nor the freedoms 
of expression and assembly are absolute, since the former can be restricted for the reasons laid 
down in Article 36 TFEU or for overriding requirements relating to the public interest, and 
the latter can be limited in accordance with paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. 
The Court concluded that in those circumstances the interests involved must be weighed in 
order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between them. Important to note, 
however, is that the ECJ emphasized that the competent national authorities enjoy a wide 
margin of discretion in that regard.302 In fact, the Court’s assessment can be described as a 
review of the mere reasonableness of the decision, whereby the more detailed means of 
ensuring the protection of the fundamental rights in issue were left to the Austrian 
authorities.303 Nevertheless, the Court found it necessary to determine whether the restrictions 
placed upon inter-state trade were proportionate in the light of the legitimate objective of 
protecting fundamental rights. In this respect, circumstances such as the limited obstruction in 
time, space and seriousness and the various measures taken by the competent authorities in 
order to limit the disruption to road traffic were taken into account. Furthermore, the Court 
paid special attention to the fact that the objective of the demonstrators was not to restrict 
trade in goods but to manifest their opinion in public.304 As to the possibility to use less 
restrictive means the Court held that, taking account of the Member States' wide margin of 
discretion, the national authorities were entitled to consider that an outright ban on the 
demonstration would have constituted unacceptable interference with the fundamental rights 
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of the demonstrators. Similarly, the imposition of stricter conditions concerning both the site 
and the duration of the demonstration could have been perceived as an excessive restriction, 
depriving the action of a substantial part of its scope. The Court motivated these findings by 
stressing that an action of that type usually entails inconvenience for non-participants, in 
particular as regards free movement, but the inconvenience may in principle be tolerated 
provided that the objective pursued is essentially the public and lawful demonstration of an 
opinion. Finally, the Court accepted the argument of the Austrian government that all the 
alternative solutions which could be countenanced would have been liable to cause much 
more serious disruption to inter-state trade and public order. Consequently, the ECJ found that 
the national authorities were reasonably entitled, having regard to the wide discretion which 
must be accorded to them in the matter, to consider that the legitimate aim of that 
demonstration could not be achieved by measures less restrictive of inter-state trade.305 The 
case has caused some confusion as to which ground of justification the Court applied.306 Was 
it the mandatory requirements or overriding reasons in the public interest, developed under 
the Cassis de Dijon line of jurisprudence or did the Court in fact introduce a new ground of 
justification?307 In paragraphs 79-81 of the judgement it seems as though the Court is heading 
towards a model based on the fundamental right as the main principle and the fundamental 
freedom as the exception. However, in paragraph 82, the Court makes a shift and subjects the 
disruption caused by the protection of the fundamental right to the traditional proportionality 
test, albeit with a more deferential approach than usual on account of the Member State 
(non)action. Consequently, whether the ground of justification is to be attributed to the 
mandatory requirements or not, free movement is to be considered as the guiding principle 
and the fundamental right as the tolerable exception, provided that it fulfils the requirements 
of the proportionality test. 308  
    In Omega, the interests at stake were the freedom to provide services vis-à-vis respect for 
human dignity. The conflict arose from the Bonn police authorities’ decision to prohibit the 
applicant Omega, a German company operating an installation known as a ‘laserdrome’, from 
commercially exploiting games simulating acts of homicide. In support of its action, Omega 
argued that  the prohibition infringed Union law, particularly the freedom to provide services 
under Article 56 TFEU, since its ‘laserdrome’ had to use equipment and technology supplied 
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by a British company under a franchise agreement. The German courts rejected the action on 
the ground that commercial exploitation of a ‘killing game’ constituted an affront to human 
dignity, as established in Paragraph 1(1) of the German Basic (Constitutional) Law. As in 
Schmidberger, the ECJ resolved the issue by means of a soft proportionality test, leaving a 
wide margin of discretion to the competent national authorities.309 Again, the scales tipped 
over to the fundamental value at issue as protected by national constitutional law. However, in 
addition to the findings in Schmidberger, the Court made an important clarification as to the 
required status of the invoked fundamental right or value. The Court stressed that, within the 
context of the proportionality assessment, it is not indispensable for the restrictive measure 
issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all 
Member States as regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or legitimate 
interest in question is to be protected.310 Hence, the fact that the principle of respect for 
human dignity in Germany had a particular status as an independent fundamental right, not 
enjoyed in all Member States, did neither exclude the invocation of that principle as forming a 
part of the public policy derogation, nor preclude the measure at issue from being suitable and 
necessary. Consequently, the Court showed a great sensitiveness to the value diversity of the 
Member States and treated national constitutional standards not as contradicting the objectives 
of the Union, but as forming a part of it.  
5.2 Viking and Laval  
5.2.1 Exempting collective action from the free movement provisions? 
In Viking and Laval, the arguments of the parties were not only confined to the possibility of 
justification, but were also revolved around the question whether the right to take collective 
action at all could be subject to the free movement provisions. The first argument in that 
regard was based on Article 137(5) EC, according to which the Union does not have 
competence to regulate the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. The defendants 
and the Swedish and Danish governments therefore argued that those rights fall outside the 
scope of the fundamental freedoms laid down in Article 49 and 56 TFEU. Not surprisingly, 
the Court rejected this argument, referring to well established case- law in the field of social 
security and direct taxation.  311 In these cases, the Court has repeatedly pointed out that, even 
in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Union’s competence, the Member States must, 
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when exercising their exclusive competence, nevertheless comply with Union law.312  The 
second argument, based inter alia on Article 11 of the EHRC, was that the right to take 
collective action constitutes a fundamental right which, as such, falls outside the scope of 
Article 49 and 56 TFEU. With reference to the European Social Charter, International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 87, the Union Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights 
of Workers and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court did indeed recognize the 
right to collective action as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general 
principles of Union law. Nevertheless, it dismissed the argument. Firstly, the Court pointed 
out that this right may be subject to certain restrictions, which is reaffirmed by Article 28 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as well as by Finnish and Swedish 
law. Secondly, the Court recalled the judgments of Schmidberger and Omega, where it was 
established that the exercise of fundamental rights does not fall outside the scope of the 
provisions of the Treaty, but must be reconciled with the requirements relating to rights 
protected under the Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality.313 
Accordingly, the mere fact that the right to take collective action can be characterized as 
fundamental could not remove it from the scope of the free movement provisions. The final 
argument, submitted by the FSU and ITF, was that the Court’s reasoning in the Albany 
judgment314 should be applied by analogy to the case in Viking. In that judgment, the ECJ 
exempted collective agreements from the application of the Treaty rules on competition, the 
rational being that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements 
and, consequently, that the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be 
seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article 81(1) EC.315 
According to FSU and ITF, the same reasoning was applicable in the context of the 
fundamental freedoms. However, without further explanation, the Court merely stated that so 
was not the case.316 By firmly rejecting all three arguments, the ECJ thus established that 
there is, at least under circumstances comparable to those in Viking and Laval, no room for 
excluding the right to take collective action from the Treaty provisions on free movement.       
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5.2.2 Justification  
As to the question of justification, the judgments in Viking and Laval have some common 
features, but differ on several points. In both cases, the Court underlined that the Union has 
not only an economic but also a social purpose and that the rights under the Treaty provisions 
on free movement thus must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy, 
which include, as is clear from the first paragraph of Article 151 TFEU, inter alia, improved 
living and working conditions. Therefore, the right to take collective action for the protection 
of workers is a legitimate interest which, in principle, may justify a restriction on one of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.317 However, while in Viking the Court partly 
left this assessment, although with strict guidelines, to the national court, it determined the 
issue by itself in Laval.318 Hereafter, I will present the Court’s reasoning in the two cases 
separately, starting with Viking.  
     In Viking, the Court separated between the collective action taken by FSU on the one hand 
and the action of the ITF on the other. In regard of the former action the Court held that 
even if it could reasonably be considered to fall, at first sight, within the objective of 
protecting workers, such a view would no longer be tenable if it were established that the jobs 
or conditions of employment at issue were not jeopardised or under serious threat.319 
Consequently, the Court added one condition for the national court to evaluate when 
determining the objective pursued by the trade unions. Relevant in this respect was the legal 
status of an undertaking made by Viking not to terminate the employment of any employees 
by reason of the reflagging. If it transpired that the undertaking was as binding as the terms of 
a collective agreement and was of such a nature as to provide a guarantee to the workers that 
the statutory provisions would be complied with and the terms of the collective agreement 
governing their working relationship maintained, the jobs or working conditions could not be 
considered as jeopardised or seriously threatened. Whether that was the case was left to the 
national court to consider. 320 The ECJ then proceeded to comment on whether the collective 
action initiated by the FSU was suitable and necessary. As regards the suitability, the Court 
concluded that it is common ground that collective action may be one of the main ways in 
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which trade unions protect the interests of their members. As to the necessity test, the Court 
required an examination of whether the FSU had had other less restrictive means at its 
disposal in order to bring the collective negotiations to a successful conclusion and whether it 
had exhausted those means before initiating the action. That examination was also left to the 
national judges.321 In respect of the collective action seeking to implement the ITF policy, on 
the other hand, the ECJ excluded all possibilities of justification. The Court’s two main 
concerns were, firstly, that the policy was directed against the nationality of the beneficial 
owner of the vessel and, secondly, that the ITF policy came into play regardless of whether 
the reflagging in issue was liable to have a harmful effect on the work or conditions of 
employment of the employees concerned. Therefore, the action of the ITF did not come 
within the scope of protection of workers.322  
     In Laval the Court submitted that blockading action by a trade union of the host Member 
State which is aimed at ensuring that workers posted in the framework of a transnational 
provision of services have their terms and conditions of employment fixed at a certain level, 
in principle, falls within the objective of protecting workers. However, when it came to the 
specific obligations linked to the signature of the collective agreement at issue, the obstacle 
which the collective action formed could not be justified with regard to such an objective. 
This finding was directly linked to the requirements of the Posted Workers Directive and was 
motivated by the fact that the employer of the home state is required, as a result of the 
coordination achieved by that directive, to observe a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum 
protection in the host Member State and the requirements of the collective agreement for the 
building sector in certain aspects fell outside that nucleus.323 As to the collective action which 
sought to impose negotiations on pay, the Court held that when such negotiations form part of 
a national context characterised by a lack of provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently 
precise and accessible that they do not render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice 
for the undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards 
minimum pay, that action cannot be justified in the light of the objective of protecting 
workers.324 
     To sum up, the action taken by the ITF as well as those initiated by Byggnads was not 
considered to fall within the aim of protecting workers, while the justifiability of the action 
taken by the FSU was left to the national court. 
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5.3 Legal analysis of Viking and Laval  
5.3.1 The recognition of the right to collective action as a fundamental right  
The recognition in Viking and Laval of the right to collective action as a fundamental right has 
been described as a step forward for the trade union movement and as an important 
clarification of its status in Union law.325 Another essential feature of the judgments is 
allegedly that the ECJ referred to a variety of international human rights sources, thus 
acknowledging the relevance of other instruments and bodies in the human rights field.326 Not 
least, the citing of the European Charter of fundamental rights has been held vital, since the 
Court thereby demonstrated a willingness to use it as an independent source of fundamental 
rights in Union law.327 More importantly, it indicates how the ECJ will apply the Charter now 
that it has become legally binding by virtue of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Noticeable though, is that the Court did not refer to Article 11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the freedom of association including the right to 
form and join trade unions. However, by virtue of Article 6(2) EU, the Court is required, 
although not formally bound, to respect the standards of the Convention. 328 In any event, the 
mere recognition of the right to collective action can be held to strengthen its position in 
Union law. However, despite its status as a fundamental right the Court made it subject to the 
Treaty provisions on free movement and conditional on the satisfaction of the proportionality 
test. It thus seems motivated to ask whether the ECJ thereby introduced a formal hierarchy 
between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights and gave primacy to the former. 
Should that be the case, it would seem as if the recognition of the right to collective action as 
a fundamental right was quite insignificant. In my opinion the question must however be 
answered in the negative. Conversely, the Court’s intention was to adopt a “consensualist” 
model based on the possibility to reconcile the interests at stake, as it did in Schmidberger and 
Omega. This solution thus contrasts to the conflictual conception applied in Albany, which, if 
chosen, would have constituted a hierarchy in favour of fundamental rights.329 As the Court 
underlined, the right to collective action is not absolute and must, pursuant to Article 28 of the 
Charter and to the constitutions of the Member States concerned, be exercised in accordance 
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with national law and practices as well as Union law.330 In addition, Article 52 of the Charter 
admits to limitations of the freedoms and rights recognized by it, provided that the limitations 
are proportionate and respect the essence of the freedom or right concerned. This further 
supports the consensualist conception announced by the Court. Moreover, the consensualist 
approach is, in my view, also in line with the case- law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) concerning Article 11 ECHR.331 This article contains a positive right of 
association including a right for trade unions to resort to collective action. On the other hand, 
it comprises a negative aspect, that is, a right not to be forced to join an association.332 This 
negative right can be relied upon by an employer, such as Viking Line or Laval, who wish not 
to be forced into a collective bargaining system.  Consequently, the positive right of 
association and the corresponding right to collective action must be balanced against the 
negative right of association and the related freedom of movement, in order to strike a fair 
balance between them. A solution based on the exclusion of the right to collective action from 
Article 49 and 56 TFEU would thus have given unlimited primacy to that right over both the 
negative right of association and the freedom of movement in contradiction to ECHR as well 
as the TFEU. Therefore, a model of reconciliation seems to be the only tenable choice. 
Accordingly, the Court was correct in rejecting all arguments which advocated for the 
exclusion of the right to collective action from the Treaty provisions on free movement.333 
That said, it is not immaterial that the Court used free movement as the main principle and the 
right to collective action as the exception. As Hös rightly points out, with an inappropriate use 
of the proportionality principle, the Court risks creating a de facto hierarchy between the 
fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights within the EC legal order.334 I will return to this 
below. 
5.3.2 The protection of the right to collective action – a legitimate aim? 
At first sight, it might seem as if the model chosen for reconciling fundamental freedoms and 
fundamental rights in Schmidberger and Omega was also applied in Viking and Laval, 
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although with different outcomes.335 However, at a closer look, one can discern some crucial 
differences, one of them which relates to the possibility to use the protection of the 
fundamental freedom as a legitimate aim of justification. In Schmidberger and Omega, the 
protection of fundamental rights was accepted as a legitimate aim in itself. In Viking and 
Laval, however, the protection of the right to take collective action was not sufficient in that 
regard. In addition, it had to be established that the collective action, in turn, pursued a 
legitimate aim in compliance with the objectives of the Union, namely that of protecting 
workers.336  This difference can be explained by the fact that the former cases concerned the 
State’s protection of fundamental rights while the latter regarded private parties’ exercise of 
such rights. As the Court explained in Schmidberger, the demonstrators’ aim to protect the 
environment could not be imputable to the Member State, whose sole purpose when allowing 
the demonstration was to protect the freedom of assembly and expression. 337 In Viking and 
Laval on the other hand, the target was not the respective Member State’s protection of the 
right to take collective action, but the trade unions exercise of it, whereby the aim of the trade 
unions became relevant for the purposes of justifying the action.338 As logical as this 
reasoning may seem, it can nevertheless lead to odd results. If a challenge of collective action 
under the Treaty provisions on free movement is invoked against a Member State for allowing 
the action, instead of against the responsible trade union, would it not be possible, following 
the reasoning in Schmidberger, for that State to rely on the protection of such action as a 
legitimate aim in itself? However, such a differentiated application would run counter to one 
of the alleged main reasons for subjecting trade unions to the free movement provisions, i.e. 
to maintain the uniform application of Union law.339 Regardless of how the Court will solve 
that issue, it can be concluded that the protection of the right to take collective action 
seemingly cannot be used as an independent ground of justification when invoked by a trade 
union. Consequently, the possibility of justifying collective action will be dependent on 
whether the particular action can be considered as falling within the aim of protecting 
workers. But is this really a problem? Given that the Court repeatedly has held that protection 
of workers is a legitimate aim as well, one ground of justification seems as good as the other. 
In Viking and Laval, however, it was proven that so is not the case. By adding, in Viking, the 
requirement that the jobs or conditions of employment has to be jeopardised or under serious 
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threat, it seems as though the Court is unwilling to take account of positive long term effects 
of collective action if no immediate danger to the working conditions can be established.340 If 
trade unions are only allowed to protect the terms of the current crew, from which newly hired 
workers won’t benefit, the consequence may well be a gradual decline in worker protection 
over time.341 The rejection of the ITF policy arguably entails the same consequence with 
regard to solidarity action. Given that the rejection was based on the policy’s automatic 
character, the Court implies that it is not sufficient for unions to show the overall benefits of a 
policy for the protection of workers.  Instead, they must be able to show the actual benefits of 
each action. 342 This narrow interpretation of workers protection is in direct opposition to the 
approach taken by the ECtHR in Gustafsson v. Sweden. In that case, the ECtHR took account, 
not only of the collective action at issue in the case, but also of the benefits which the Swedish 
collective bargaining system as a whole created for the protection of workers. Therefore, the 
ECtHR found no reason to doubt that the action pursued a legitimate interest.343 Furthermore, 
in Laval, the Court refused to accept workplace- level collective bargaining on minimum 
wages as falling within the objective of protecting workers. This rigid attitude towards the 
Scandinavian collective bargaining model contrasts significantly to the sensitiveness the 
Court demonstrated to na tional value diversity in Omega, where the precise way in which the 
fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is to be protected was held to be 
incumbent on each Member State. Should the Court persist in these views, they will amount 
to substantial restrains on the right to take collective action.          
5.3.3 Proportionality and the margin of discretion 
Another crucial difference between Schmidberger and Omega and Viking and Laval is the 
wide margin of discretion to balance the conflicting interests that was left to the respective 
states in the former cases, but denied the trade unions in the latter. Hereby, the ECJ also chose 
to take a different path than the ECtHR, who has conferred on the Contracting States a wide 
margin of appreciation as to how the freedom of trade unions to protect the occupational 
interests of their members may be secured.344 This might explain why the Court refrained 
from citing the ECHR in support of the right’s status as a fundamental principle of Union law. 
This firm treatment of trade unions as compared to the more lenient approach towards 
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Member States is in my view somewhat surprising, since the Court, by way of horizontal 
application, did not hesitate to impose on the trade unions the obligations of a state to respect 
free movement.345 This is all the more so since it seems highly motivated to grant private 
parties an even wider margin of discretion, given that those parties, unlike the Member states, 
are not bound by the loyalty obligation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU.346 Instead, the Court 
merely transposed a strict application of the principle of proportionality, which was developed 
mainly to review measures of the state, to measures of private parties. The novelty does not 
lie in the fact that the ECJ applied the proportionality principle in a private law context – so 
has been done inter alia in sex discrimination cases – but in the way the Court used that 
principle to defy the invocation of a fundamental right. In discrimination cases, the starting 
point is the protection of the fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the basis of 
sex, and the violation of this right must be proportionate. 347 By contrast, in Viking and Laval, 
free movement was the point of departure and the fundamental right the derogation which had 
to be proportionate. Even though this was the case also in Schmidberger and Omega, the 
Court managed in those cases to offset the advantage thus given to free movement by granting 
the counterpart of discretion as regards the means to ensure the protection of the fundamental 
right. In particular, when considering the deferential approach the Court took in Schmidberger 
in regard of the (non)possibility to use less restrictive means, compared to the firm “less-
restrictive-alternative test” it required in Viking, the contrast between the cases becomes 
evident. While in Schmidberger the Court paid special attention to the risk of depriving the 
demonstration of a substantial part of its scope, that is, the relative effectiveness of the 
demonstration, it did not even consider that issue with regard to the collective action in 
Viking. This, even though that issue was just as relevant in Viking, since collective action, like 
demonstrations, entail a direct conflict between the efficiency of the action on the one hand 
and the disruption for non-participants on the other. In other words, the greater disruption the 
collective action causes to the employer, the more effective it is likely to be in compelling the 
employer to make concessions. There are of course several ways for trade unions to protest 
against employers’ action without restricting free movement, such as a march or a leafleting 
campaign, but the relative effectiveness of those measures must be taken into account when 
determining whether there are less restrictive means at disposal. In other words, they must be 
capable of achieving in essence the same result as the measure under review in order to be 
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treated as genuine alternatives.348 However, if the proportionality test is supposed to serve as a 
way of reconciling freedom of movement and the right to collective action, the action may not 
be so effective as to deprive the freedom of its meaning.349 Correspondingly, the freedom of 
movement must not undermine the essence of the right to collective action so that workers 
will be deprived of adequate protection. Arguably, the former scenario was the Court’s main 
concern in Viking, given that the collective action in question prevented the company from 
making use of the right to freely establish itself in another Member State. At least, this 
seemed to be the apprehension of Advocate General Maduro, who held that Article 49 TFEU 
should preclude collective action which has the effect of partitioning the labour market, as it 
would strike at the heart of the principle of non-discrimination.350 So what should have been 
the result of the balancing on interests in Viking?351 In my opinion, the aim to retain Finnish 
working conditions could probably not have been satisfied by less restrictive means. 
Therefore, the reconciliation would inevitably have boiled down to a question of where the 
limit for workers protection is to be drawn, that is, the degree to which workers can claim 
protection. That assessment would thus amount to a proportionality test strictu sensu, 
according to which an action with too excessive effects on free movement (or, 
correspondingly, too excessive claims on the level of workers protection) will be considered 
as disproportionate. In Viking, the claimed degree of protection, i.e. the working conditions 
established in Finnish law and collective agreements, was arguably too far-reaching, as it 
prevented the employer from making use of the freedom of establishment. Hence, although 
there might not have been any less restrictive means for ensuring that level of protection, the 
action would nevertheless have fallen foul to the proportionality test strictu sensu. It is true 
though, that the Court never went so far as to this third step of the proportionality review, thus 
implying that the issue could be settled already at the second step. However, it can also be 
explained by the fact that a proportionality review strictu sensu would have required the Court 
to interfere with sensitive matters of national social policy, or, more particularly, to specify 
the agreeable level of national workers protection. The latter explanation is what I consider to 
be most likely, since the ECJ generally is more cautious in adjudicating such matters.352 
Consequently, by merely leaving the necessity assessment to the national court, the ECJ 
managed to avoid the delicate task of balancing the interests at stake, but still signal the 
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desired outcome by denying the trade unions the relief of discretion. In Schmidberger on the 
other hand a proportionality test strictu sensu was not as controversial. The demonstration, 
which was limited in site and duration, kept within the level of acceptable protection and the 
Court therefore made clear that the transportation companies had to tolerate the inconvenience 
with regard to free movement which the demonstration created.353 
     It has been held that subjecting the right to collective action to any form of proportionality 
test would be inappropriate, since such a test is particularly problematic in an industrial action 
context. As Bercusson points out, that right is inextricably linked to the collective bargaining 
process and must be assessed in the context of that process. In his opinion it is difficult to 
sensibly apply such a test to the demands of a trade union, given that it is in the very nature of 
negotiations that both parties set demands at their highest and through negotiation over time 
seek a compromise. He rightly asks himself at what stage of this process and against what 
criteria the test is to be applied.354 Although I agree with his points in substance, I would not 
go so far as to rule out the application of any form of proportionality review. As mentioned 
above, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights accepts limitations to the right to 
collective action insofar as the right at issue is not deprived of its essence. In my view, it is 
here the problem lies with the proportionality test applied in Viking. By refusing the unions 
the relief of discretion, the ECJ created a climate of insecurity as to the legal scope of 
collective action under Union law, capable of disturbing the balance between the parties of the 
collective bargaining process. Thereby, it deprives the right to collective action of a 
substantial part of its essence. In my opinion, trade unions must enjoy a wide margin of 
discretion, both with regard to the test of necessity and to the proportionality test strictu sensu. 
Hence, only actions which are manifestly inadequate for ensuring protection of workers or 
actions which undermines the meaning of free movement, e.g. by grossly violating the non-
discrimination principle, should be considered as disproportionate.355   
     As follows from the foregoing, the recognition of the right to collective action as a 
fundamental right may have been important in principle, but proved to be less important in 
practice. By not accepting the protection of that right as a legitimate aim per se combined with 
the denial of a wide margin of discretion, the ECJ appears to have introduced a de facto 
hierarchy between fundamental freedoms and the fundamental right to collective action. 
Seemingly, primacy was given to the former. 
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5.4 General consequences of Viking and Laval  for the right to collective action 
So what general conclusions for the right to collective action can be drawn from the Court’s 
findings in Viking and Laval? Would the outcome be as harsh for a trade union whose 
collective action is neither aimed at, nor has the effect of adversely affecting cross-border 
situations as compared to internal ones? To start with the question whether the right to 
collective action can be exempted from the scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement, 
I dare say that such a possibility is excluded, regardless of the non-discriminatory nature of 
the action. The judgements in Schmidberger, Omega, Viking and Laval are consistent: 
fundamental rights which are not absolute will not prima facie escape the ambit of free 
movement solely by virtue of their status as such rights. The challenged measures in both 
Schmidberger and Omega can be characterized as non-discriminatory, but that had no bearing 
on this conclusion. The same should apply in regard of non-discriminatory collective action. 
      As to the question of justification, the statements of the Court in Viking and Laval may not 
be as generally applicable. It seems undisputable though, given that the judgements are 
unanimous on this point, that the protection of collective action cannot be used as an 
independent ground of justification when invoked by a trade union. However, in my opinion, 
there are reasons to question whether all collective action will be subject to such strict 
scrutiny as in Viking and Laval with respect to the aim of protecting workers. The added 
requirement in Viking that the jobs or working conditions has to be seriously threatened was, 
as paragraph 82 of the judgement indicates, compelled by the undertaking made by Viking 
Line not to terminate the employment of any employees by reason of the reflagging. 
Accordingly, when such an undertaking is not involved, the Court might not put any emphasis 
on the requirement at issue. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that this requirement was 
introduced in a company relocation context and, consequently, it is not beyond questioning 
that the Court will apply this requirement in other situations. The fact that the requirement 
was not repeated in Laval supports that assumption. Even though indisputably short-sighted, 
demanding that a relocation actually threatens the jobs or working conditions in some sense 
seems fairly rationale. But if that requirement is strictly upheld in other contexts, for instance 
when the collective action is prompted by a demand for higher wages, it would rule out any 
collective action with market access implications that is aimed at improving working 
conditions. Surely, that cannot be the Court’s intent. As regards the rejection of the ITF 
policy, the opinion of Advocate General Maduro may shed light on the Court’s reasoning. 
The Court as well as its advocate general accepted that a policy of coordinated action as a 
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means to improve the terms of employment is, in principle, aimed at protecting workers, but 
were concerned with the automatic character of the ITF policy. 356 While the Court was 
relatively silent as to the reasons for this concern, the advocate general explained it by the fact 
that such a policy may be abused in a discriminatory manner.  In his opinion, such a policy 
would be liable to protect the collective bargaining power of some national unions at the 
expense of the interests of others, and to partition the labour market in breach of the rules on 
freedom of movement. Arguably, this means that a policy which merely entails long-term 
positive effect for the protection of workers still will be justifiable as long as those effects are 
not liable to be discriminatory. Even though the Court did not explicitly refer to the advocate 
general, it followed his reasoning in effect. Consequently, if faced with a case concerning 
non-discriminatory collective action, it is in my view not impossible that the Court will take 
inspiration from its advocate general and take a more deferential approach. As regards the 
assessment in Laval, the Court’s main concern was arguably the way in which Sweden had 
implemented the PWD and the outcome a direct result thereof. The fact that the ECJ refused 
to consider work-place level bargaining as a means for protecting workers in a posted workers 
context does not necessarily mean that that is the Court’s general attitude towards such 
bargaining. Hence, the conclusions reached in Laval cannot unreservedly be transposed to 
cases which do not concern posted workers. 
     In regard of the proportionality review it should first be noted that this is a highly context-
sensitive test, which differs considerably from case to case.357 Therefore, it would be hasty to 
draw too far-reaching conclusions from the review in Viking. As de Búrca emphasises, the 
way the proportionality principle is applied covers a spectrum ranging from a very deferential 
approach, to quite a rigorous examination of the justification for a measure which has been 
challenged. The level of scrutiny will depend inter alia on the nature of the interest involved, 
the existence of Union competence in the area and the severity of the challenged restriction. 
The ECJ generally takes a more deferential approach if the interest of the State concerns an 
area involving national economic and social policy choices and if the aim of the measure 
primarily lies within the competence of the Member State.358 This would explain why the 
Court left the national court with such sparse guidance in regard of the necessity test in 
Viking. On the other hand, it fits ill with the refusal to grant the trade union a wide margin of 
discretion. However, this may be due to the severity of the actions taken by the FSU and ITF 
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and, as stressed above, the will to signal that the actions were not justifiable. Personally, I can 
see no other reason for imposing on a trade union, whose action is consistent with national 
law, an element of self-regulation with regard to EU law, stricter than that of the Member 
State. It should also be borne in mind that the Court did not explicitly deny trade unions the 
relief of discretion – it simply did not admit to it. In my view, it seems far from unlikely that 
the Court will admit to such discretion in a case where the disruption to the freedom of 
movement is not as severe, thus bringing the application in line with Schmidberger and 
Omega as well as with the case- law of the ECtHR. In fact, it could even be held that the 
outcome in Viking, although not the explicit reasoning, is consistent with the case- law of 
Strassbourg. In Sorensen v. Rasmussen the ECtHR held that where the domestic law of a 
Contracting State permits actions which run counter to the freedom of choice of the individual 
inherent in Article 11, the margin of appreciation must be considered as reduced. A similar 
reasoning can be applied with regard to the collective action in Viking; since the actions taken 
by the FSU ran counter to the very essence of the freedom of establishment, the margin of 
discretion diminished. Consequently, the ECJ might implicitly have followed the reasoning of 
the ECtHR. 359 If so, this further supports that the Court is prepared to apply a more lenient 
approach when the restriction is not as severe. In addition, the Court seemingly takes regard 
of whether the aim of the action includes an element of protectionism. This was evident in 
Schmidberger where the Court underlined that the purpose of the demonstration was not to 
restrict trade in goods of a particular type or from a particular source.360 This statement 
suggests that the margin of justification widens when there is no protective aim of the 
measure. Since the collective action taken by the trade unions in Viking was eminently 
protective, the margin of justification narrowed.  Following this logic, a collective action 
which has no such aim, e.g. an ordinary wage strike, will enjoy a greater margin of 
justification.  
     In conclus ion, the question on how to strike a balance between the freedom of movement 
and the right to collective action was in my opinion most likely not settled once and for all in 
Viking and Laval. On the contrary, there is much to indicate that the ECJ might restore the 
balance which was disturbed in those cases.  
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5.5 Implications of the binding nature of the Charter of fundamental rights 
As mentioned above in chapter 5.3.1, since the Court delivered its judgement in Viking and 
Laval, the EU Charter of fundamental rights has become legally binding by virtue of the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. May this have any implications on the Court’s application of 
the free movement provisions to the right to collective action? Given that the Court actually 
did take account of the Charter when recognizing the right to collective action as a 
fundamental principle of Union law in both Viking and Laval, the answer seems to be 
negative.361 On the other hand, it is noticeable how the Court refrained from referring to the 
Charter again when it was considering how the right to collective action may legitimately be 
limited.362 Arguably, the Court will from now on have to apply the Charter provisions dealing 
with those issues alongside the Treaty provisions when a fundamental right protected by that 
charter is involved. But will this really make any difference in the collective action versus free 
movement context? Article 28 of the Charter clearly stipulates that the right to collective 
action exists only within the limits of Union law, thus confirming the accuracy in the Court’s 
choice to regard that right as a derogation to free movement. Consequently, it seems unlikely 
that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will induce the Court to change this legal 
practice.363  
     This does not mean however that it will have no implications at all. As mentioned above, 
Article 52(1) of the Charter requires that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms recognized therein must be proportionate and respect the essence of the freedom or 
right concerned. In Viking and Laval, the Court was more concerned with the proportionality 
of the restrictions to the Treaty freedoms of movement and the preservation of their essence. 
Accordingly, the ECJ will now have to take account of the proportionality of the restriction 
which the freedom of movement creates to the right to collective action and vice versa and 
make sure that the essence of both the right and the freedom are preserved. In other words, it 
must actually perform the reconciliation which was initially announced to take place in those 
cases. This could in my opinion be accomplished by granting the trade unions a wide margin 
of discretion and by taking account of the interference that free movement causes to the right 
to collective action within the framework of the necessity test, as the Court did in 
Schmidberger. 
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     Furthermore, Article 52(3) of the Charter stipulates that the meaning and scope of the 
rights in the Charter that correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR shall be the same, 
unless Union law provide for more extensive protection. One such right is the freedom of 
association established in Article 12(1) of the Charter, which, pursuant to the explanation, 364  
correspond to Article 11 of the ECHR. According to the explanation, the meaning and the 
scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but 
also by the case- law of the ECtHR and by the ECJ. Even though this does not make the ECJ 
bound by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR it still promotes deference on the part of the ECJ to 
the ECtHR. 365 Hence, Article 52(3) of the Charter read together with the explanation to that 
article, provides for incentives for the Court to apply the more lenient approach employed by 
the ECtHR with regard to the right to take collective action inherent in the freedom of 
association. 366 Whether the Court actually will adhere to these incentives remains however to 
be seen.  
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6. Discussion and conclusions  
To include non-discriminatory collective action within the scope of Article 56 TFEU would 
unquestionably be a broad interpretation of the free movement of services, but certainly not an 
impossible one. Holding private parties accountable for non-discriminatory restrictions on the 
free movement of services caused by the exercise of a fundamental right would supposedly 
take free movement quite a few steps further than the drafters of the EEC Treaty367 originally 
intended. However, due to the ECJ’s expanding interpretation of the notion of a restriction, 
from a mere prohibition on discrimination to a ban against all measures liable to affect the 
market access to another Member state, combined with the introduction of (semi-)horizontal 
direct effect, such an outcome is today possible. During the course of this essay, these 
questions – limiting the scope of application, horizontal direct effect and reconciling 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms by way of a proportionality test – have for the 
most part been treated separately. Yet, these issues are closely interrelated. There is a direct 
link between the test defining the scope of application of free movement and the application 
of the proportionality test. Since national measures can fall more easily under the scope of the 
four freedoms in a market access test than in a discrimination test, the proportionality test will 
to a great extent define which measures are lawful under Union law and which ones are not.368 
Likewise, the possibility to apply Article 56 TFEU horizontally is intimately linked to the 
existence of a restriction and to the way in which the proportionality principle is applied. 
Naturally, actions of private parties can scarcely constitute restrictions on free movement if 
the free movement provisions cannot be applied to such actions, that is, if they are not capable 
of having some form of horizontal direct effect. And what exactly has to be balanced under 
the proportionality principle in horizontal situations? Is it the effective functioning of the 
internal market that must be balanced against the protection of a fundamental right? Or is it 
rather the interests of the specific employers and workers that must be balanced against each 
other? Can a principle developed mainly to review state measures and regulations be applied 
as strictly to actions of private parties, particularly in their exercise of a fundamental right?  
     In my opinion, this is mainly where the judgements in Viking and Laval went wrong, that 
is, the problem does not lie so much in the assessment of each question as in the fact that the 
Court refrained from taking account of the combined effect of these assessments. Hence, it is 
                                                 
367 The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community which preceded the Treaty establishing the 
European Community which, in turn, preceded the TFEU. 
368 Hös p. 5. 
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rather the effects that Viking and Laval might cause on national collective bargaining systems, 
than the outcomes per se, I turn against. The combined effect of using a far-reaching market 
access test and apply it to the actions of trade unions while at the same time limiting the 
grounds of justification and restricting the margin of discretion, is namely to create a risk of 
undermining the effectiveness with which labours standard can be applied to national level. 369 
Even though not every collective action will fall foul to the market access test, it is likely to 
catch the vast majority of them. Accordingly, not only actions of the types in Viking and 
Laval aimed at battling competition from low-wage Member States with the effect of 
discriminating against such states, but also more “ordinary” actions, e.g. strikes or blockades 
initiated against domestic employers in order to enforce higher wages or to reduce the use of 
hired personnel may come within the scope of Article 56 TFEU. Also in those cases, the 
burden of proof will in practice shift from the service provider to establish the existence of a 
restriction to the trade unions to justify their action under the test of proportionality. Given the 
harsh criteria that the Court set up in the latter regard, this will be quite a heavy burden for 
trade unions to bear. If interpreted strictly, these criteria would inter alia entail that trade 
unions only are allowed to take collective action in order to protect the current terms of the 
current staff, that work-place level bargaining is not an acceptable method for protecting 
workers and that trade unions do not enjoy a wide margin of discretion when determining 
whether there are less restrictive means at disposal. Should the Court stringently uphold these 
criteria, it seems as if few actions could be considered lawful under Union law. Now that is 
hardly the Court’s intent. Thus, in order to avoid such consequences the Court will either have 
to create a link between the questions of limiting the scope of application, horizontal direct 
effect and justification or simply reverse some of the conditions of justification it set up in 
Viking and Laval. One way of accomplishing the former would be to regard private measures 
as restrictions only when some form of discrimination is involved. However, discrimination 
as a criterion for the application of the Walrave formula has for long been abandoned and it 
thus seems unlikely that the Court would reintroduce that criterion. Another solution would be 
to mitigate the conditions of justification in horizontal situations, at least when the private 
parties are exercising a fundamental right, as suggested in chapter 5.3.3. This was the solution 
advocated for by Advocate General Maduro in his opinion in Viking and the one which 
actually was applied in Schmidberger. In my view, this would also be the best way both to 
preserve the autonomy of private parties and to reconcile fundamental freedoms and 
                                                 
369 Deakin p. 21 
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fundamental rights.  In any event, now that the Court has chosen to apply the far-reaching 
market access test to collective action and given Article 56 TFEU a semi-horizontal direct 
effect it is all the more important that the principle of proportionality, which in practice will 
determine the legality of such action, is applied in a predictable and consistent manner. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s interpretation of that principle has not always been that predictable 
and consistent and, as is evident from Viking and Laval, is often difficult to transpose to other 
contexts. This brings an element of insecurity into national collective bargaining systems 
which primarily will work in favour of the employer’s side, since trade unions will have a 
hard time determining the legality of their actions under Union law. Hence, in order to avoid 
such disturbance in the balance of industrial relations, the Court must clarify the application 
of the proportionality principle in the collective action versus free movement context. Until 
then, the scope of the free movement of services, in particular the margin of justification, with 
regard to non-discriminatory collective action must be regarded as an unsettled issue in Union 
law.  
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